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I. Introduction 
 
At almost 25 years of distance, Cappelleti, Seccombe and Weiler, on the one 
hand, and Delmas-Marty, on the other hand, have associated the European 
integration process with the “enigma of the ‘one and the many’ that has haunted 
human civilisation throughout history”,2 that is “the dilemma of reaching an 
equilibrium between, on the one hand, a respect for the autonomy of the individual 
unit, freedom of choice, pluralism and diversity of action, and, on the other hand, the 
societal need for cooperation, integration, harmony and, at times, unity”.3  In 1986, 
Cappelleti et al. attempted to solve that dilemma, and thus the one of European 
integration, by resorting to the concept of federalism as embodying a “societal 
philosophy and organizational principle which require a particular balancing of 
individual and communal interest - a balance between particular and general, 
peripheral and central, and between autonomy and heteronomy”4.  In 2009, Delmas-
Marty did so by resorting to the formula of “multiple interactions – judicial and 
normative, spontaneous and imposed, direct and indirect, to link together legal 
ensembles – national and international”,5 as a way “toward harmony”.6   
At the core of this tentative essay – a feeler, indeed – lays an attempt to uncover a 
relative shift in the narrative underlying the matrix of European integration – from one 
of unity and federalism to one of pluralism, harmony and multiple interactions, to 
                                                 
2
 M. Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism – A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the 
Transnational Legal World, (Hart Publ.:Oxford/Portland, 2009), p. 2. 
3
 M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Integration Through Law: Europe and the American 
Federal Experience A General Introduction’, in: M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe and J. H. H. Weiler 
(eds.), Integration Through Law, vol. 1 (Methods, Tools and Institutions), book 1 (A Political, Legal and 
Economic Overview), (Walter de Guyter:Berlin/New York, 1986), p. 4. 
4
 Ibid, p. 15. 
5
 M. Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism, above, p. 14. 
6
  Ibid, p.16.  
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trace and report on manifestations of that shift in the core praxis of the EU system – 
market integration, and to suggest an alternative conceptualization of its hidden 
èthos by means of the notions of mutual trust and distrust.7  The area of services 
forms the empirical background illustrating that three-fold proposition for it has 
presented in recent years an important source of tensions between market 
integration, regulatory diversity and social values, e.g., in the framework of the 
adoption of the Services Directive or of prominent cases decided by the Court of 
Justice.  Those instances have further highlighted the historical complexity in 
promoting cross-border trade in a sector that is by essence “uncommoditized”, relies 
on inter-personal relations, involves local (and vocal) stakeholders and whose 
regulation reflects policy options anchored in deep identity loaded social choices, 
while also accounting by far for the largest share of domestic and regional wealth.8  
In turn, those constraints have triggered a broad variety of policy interventions, 
including of a sectoral nature, and form a particularly fertile ground for exploring 
complex market integration strategies and, generally, for observing a possible 
evolution in the management of regulatory diversity at EU level.  This is the objective 
of Section I below, which reviews successively legislative instruments and the case 
law of the Court of Justice in the area of services and beyond.   
                                                 
7
 Cappelletti et al. relied on federalism as a method rather than in reference to an ideal or optimal 
state, in a way similar to Delmas-Marty when she emphasizes harmony as generation and multiple 
interactions as ongoing processes. Moreover, they rejected unity as an absolute value but presented it 
as only one dimension of federalism as a method and as one of the poles in the balancing process 
inherent to that method.  Likewise, they viewed the failure of Europe to develop into a federal super-
state as a virtue and stressed the need to promote the emergence of transnational forms of law and 
government.  Yet, beyond the epistemological weight of the ‘F-word’, they still viewed federalism as a 
frame, integration as the strength of the frame, the Union as the central authority and the US federal 
state as a comparative point of reference.  Thus, if the approaches of Cappelleti et al. and Delmas-
Marty may seem to converge from a methodological point of view, their starting point is different: the 
former explored ways to reach beyond the static model of the state and the international/national 
dichotomy, while the latter takes the pluralism of legal orders as a given and as the premise of an 
attempt to harness ‘the Great Legal Complexity of the world’  Likewise, the former relied on federalism 
to capture the tension between autonomy and heterogeneity, while the latter views autonomy as the 
source of heterogeneity.  Hence, the origins of their respective approach differ, so does their 
respective way to address the dilemma between the one and the many and, in turn, the narrative 
underlying their vision of the matrix of the EU system.  
8
  In effect, the internal market in services has continuously been lagging behind in the EU economic 
integration process, with the result of only 20% of services supplied in the EU having a cross-border 
dimension, whereas the sector accounts for 70% of EU GDP, 68% of employment, 96% of new jobs 
creation and constitutes the most important source of foreign direct investment (see: European 
Commission, The Internal Market – Ten Years Without Frontiers, pp. 6 and 22; M. Monti, ‘A New 
Strategy for the Single Market at the Service of Europe’s Economy and Society’ Report to the 
President of the European Commission, 9 May 2010, p. 53; Communication from the European 
Commission of 20 November 2007, A Single Market for the twenty-first Century, Brussels, COM(2007) 
724 final, p. 8).  
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Eventually, then, the revelation of such an evolution will allow for the reformulation 
of the inner èthos of the European market integration process, moving away from the 
narrow imagery of the removal of national barriers to trade or regulatory sameness 
and toward a multi-dimensional paradigm based on the notion of “system trust”.  As a 
paradigm, it does not espouse a deterministic model, but embodies a stochastic 
process capable of evolving over time in function of the random political shocks that 
might alter the preferences and values of the actors and thus the probable systemic 
outcomes.  In turn, that envisaged reformulation is a testament to and reveals a shift 
in the equilibrium between the one and the many in the EU system. Those 
preliminary propositions are developed in Section II below, which is followed by 
concluding remarks.   
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II. The affirmation of pluralistic concerns in EU internal market law 
 
The EU market integration programme, both in its negative or positive dimensions, 
has long been viewed as a process of re-regulation entailing the replacement of 
national economic regulations with EU rules,9 in pursuance of a functional logic of 
unity whereby the unity of the market and the unity of law was to contribute to an 
overarching goal of political unity for Europe.10  Thus, upon completion of the 
Customs Union in 1968, the Commission stated that the latter was to be followed by 
the achievement of an economic union, which required “replac[ing] the old national 
policies with Community policies”, notably through the “harmonization or unification in 
the commercial, fiscal, social, transport, and other fields, as provided for in the 
Treaties”.11   
In a context of economic crisis and political stagnation, the 1970’s gave rise to the 
unfolding of a process of negative integration led by the Court of Justice.  At the end 
of the transition period, the Court endowed successively the Treaty provisions 
guaranteeing the free movement of goods, persons and services, with direct effect,12 
thereby triggering a flurry of requests for preliminary rulings on the interpretation of 
those provisions.  The most emblematical judgments of that period remain 
Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon, in relation to the free movement of goods, which 
established the sequence of analysis applied by the Court ever since, across all four 
freedoms: (i) a far-reaching definition of the notion of obstacle to trade, combined 
with (ii) the possibility to justify the said obstacle by means of mandatory (or 
imperative) requirements in the general interest applied in a proportionate manner, 
i.e., appropriate, necessary and reflecting the (lack of) equivalence of the regulatory 
                                                 
9
 See, eg., A. R. Young, ‘The Single Market – Deregulation, Reregulation and Integration’ in: H. 
Wallace et al. (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Union 6
th
 ed., (Oxford Univ. Press, 2010), p. 107 
et seq. 
10
 P. Pescatore, ‘Les objectifs de la Communauté européenne comme principes d’interprétation dans 
la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice’ in: Miscellanea W. J. Ganshof van der Meersch, vol. 2, 
(Bruylant : Brussels, 1972), p. 351.  On the classic notion of the unity of the European market, see, 
eg., Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm, para. 5.  
11
 Declaration by the Commission on the occasion of the achievement of the customs union on 1 July 
1968 [1968] OJ 7/5.  
12
 With respect to the free movement of services, see Case 33-74, van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 
p.1299. 
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framework in place in the country of origin.13  Maduro has highlighted the institutional 
choice inherent to that sequence, “namely that it leaves the ECJ to define the 
balance between free movement and regulatory aims and therefore to define the 
appropriate regulatory policy”.14  In effect, the Court complemented the market-
building approach advocated by the Commission with the view to break the path-
dependence of actors from national systems and to promote the emergence of a new 
European majoritarian view reflecting “Community-designed values and concepts”.15  
Even though it also triggered legislative action, negative integration has therefore 
been viewed as a centralized mechanism of allocation of regulatory competence 
sheltered from the control of the EU political process. 
With the endorsement by the European Council of the Commission White Paper - 
“Completing the Internal Market” and the introduction by the Single European Act of 
qualified majority voting for the adoption of approximation measures,16 the positive 
integration process was revitalized in the mid-1980 with a view to completing “a fully 
unified internal market by 1992”.17  To achieve that objective, mutual recognition and 
equivalence was to be favoured over the approximation of Member States’ laws and 
regulations.18  Yet, the Commission relied largely on the approximation provisions of 
the amended Treaty to achieve its ambitions.  The vast majority of measures adopted 
in the framework of the single market legislative programme took the form of 
directives.19  In a decade, hundreds of them were adopted in a great variety of 
                                                 
13
 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, para. 5 and Case 
120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 
649, paras. 8-11 and 14-15.    
14
 M. P. Maduro, We, the Court: the European Court of Justice and the European economic 
constitution: a critical reading of article 30 of the EC Treaty (Hart Publ.: Oxford, 1998), p. 59.  On p. 
62, the author illustrates his view as follows: ‘After Cassis de Dijon, a stream of cases led the ECJ to 
adopt a policy of giving preference to labelling over mandatory requirements regarding the 
designation, composition or other characteristics of imported products, which led to a redefinition of 
many national regulatory policies on the characteristics and designation of goods’ 
15
 Ibid,. p. 72. This is clearly apparent from Cassis de Dijon, where the Court, by deciding that the 
German rule over minimum alcohol content failed the necessity test, replaced it with its own, namely 
that the minimum alcohol content of beverages ought to be left to the arbitration of supply and 
demand, i.e., to the market.   
16
 See, respectively: (i) Conclusions of the Milan European Council of June 28-29, 1985, Bull. of the 
Eur. Com., 1985, p. 6/13; and (ii) Single European Act [1987] OJ  L169/1. 
17
 Communication of the Commission, ‘Completing the Internal Market’, June 14, 1985 (COM(85) 310 
final), p.4 
18
 Ibid, p. 6.   
19
 A. R. Young, ‘The Single Market – Deregulation, Reregulation and Integration’, above, p. 119.  
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fields,20 either based on product-specific performance requirements combined with 
fully harmonised provisions involving, e.g., testing methods to guarantee consumer 
safety (pharmaceuticals, chemicals, automobiles, etc.), or covering large families of 
products and/or hazards and specifying minimum requirements to be met before 
being placed on the market, i.e., “new approach directives”.21  Beyond its 
achievements in economic terms,22 the internal market programme transformed 
radically the way many businesses are conducted in Europe and the success of the 
venture in “breaking through the old structures inherited from the past”,23 did not 
come without traumatic consequences.  Indeed, the enterprise was hardly politically 
neutral or value free: it inevitably involved choices between conflicting values that 
affected profoundly business cultures and consumer preferences across the EU.24  In 
turn, the magnitude of those choices led to deep and lasting criticisms of the 
centralized process whereby they were achieved.   
In essence, the criticisms directed at the market integration process, both in its 
negative or positive dimensions, are rooted in a hiatus between the nature of the 
means and the magnitude of the ends pursued.  Maduro, again, associates four 
shortcomings with the centralized model of integration, as follows: (i) lack of 
consideration for national diversity, including cultural and regulatory traditions; (ii) risk 
of reduction in legislative innovation and experimentation; (iii) risk of evasion in the 
absence of a developed sense of community or complex enforcement system; and 
(iv) questionable assumptions as to the EU’s ability to bring added value to the 
process of economic regulation in terms of efficiency and democracy.25  Those 
shortcomings have become encapsulated over time in one heavy-weighted and 
                                                 
20
 The total body of Internal Market Directives amounted to 1291 in 1995 and increased to 1475 by 
2002 (European Commission, The Internal Market – Ten Years Without Frontiers, 2002, p. 10, 
available at: ,http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/10years/docs/workingdoc/workingdoc_en.pdf last 
visited July 15, 2010).   
21
 Ibid, p. 20.    
22
 For a review of the benefits associated with the Single Market, see European Commission, The 
Internal Market – Ten Years Without Frontiers, 2002 and European Commission Staff Working 
Document, The single market: review of achievements, SEC(2007) 1521.   
23
 Declaration by the Commission on the occasion of the achievement of the customs union on 1
st
  
July 1968 OJ [1968] 7/5.  
24
 A. R. Young, ‘The Single Market – Deregulation, Reregulation and Integration’, above, p.112 and M. 
P. Maduro, We the Court, above, p. 147: ‘many obstacles to trade come from different assessments of 
what is the right policy, in terms of choice between regulation and free trade or the types of 
appropriate regulation’. 
25
 M. P. Maduro, We the Court, above, p. 114.  
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multi-faceted notion: that of (lack of) legitimacy of the Union as a regulatory and 
political body, under its two “input” and “output” aspects.26   
Ironically, by aiming to achieve one of the main objectives set forth in the Treaty of 
Rome, the internal market programme also sowed the seeds of a profound 
transformation in policy-making at EU level.  Indeed, the acknowledgment of the 
shortcomings pointed to hereinabove triggered a progressive evolution in the design 
of EU policies towards new modes of governance reflecting a willingness to improve 
the inclusiveness of decision-making and the effectiveness of policy outcomes, as 
clearly apparent, e.g., from the White Paper on European Governance.27  The 
hypothesis underlying the present section associates that evolution, combined with 
increased diversity in EU membership and the quantitative and qualitative 
enlargement of the scope of EU competences,28 with a move from unity to pluralism 
as the prevalent representation of the relation between the EU and the Member 
States, which is at the core of the Union’s “register of self-understanding”.29  In other 
words, it endeavours to link the turn to governance with the emergence of a new 
narrative underlying the EU integration process – one of pluralism – from which 
insights can be derived to inform the design of its rules, the performance of its 
functions, the understanding of its ends and eventually the definition of its nature.  In 
support of that view, it further postulates that the logic of pluralism has even 
permeated the internal market case law of the Court of Justice, in spite of the latter’s 
long-standing stance as the ultimate guardian of the unity of the market and that of 
the law.  
                                                 
26
 See, eg., K. Lenaerts and D. Gerard, ‘The Structure of the Union according to the Constitution for 
Europe: the emperor is getting dressed’, ELRev., 29 (2004) pp. 321-322: (i) input legitimacy relates to 
the direct legitimisation of political power through the democratic participation of the citizens or their 
elected representatives in transparent decision-making and constitution-making procedures; and (ii) 
output legitimacy relates to the extent to which citizens see their preferences mirrored in the outcomes 
of political processes and therefore accept and support the political order as ‘valid‘   
27
 European Commission, European Governance – a White Paper, COM(2001) 428 final (available at: 
,http://ec.europa.eu/governance/white_paper/index_en.htm (last checked February 5, 2010).   
28
 On the link between quantitative and qualitative increases in diversity and policy adaptations, see, 
eg., E. Philippart and M. Sie Dhian Ho, ‘From Uniformity to Flexibility.  The Management of Diversity 
and its Impact on the EU System of Governance’, in: G. de Burca and J. Scott (eds.), Constitutional 
Change in the EU: from Uniformity to Flexibility? (Hart Publ., Oxford, 2000), p. 300.  
29
 N. Walker, ‘Legal Theory and the European Union: A 25th Anniversary Essay’, OJLS, vol. 25 issue 
4  (2005), 581-601, p. 600. 
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This is not the place for long developments on the notion of legal pluralism.30  Yet, 
before turning to the examination of manifestations thereof at EU level, some 
clarifications are required.  Even though it took a different turn immediately after,31 
the very early case law of the Court of Justice enshrines the basic premise of a 
pluralistic account of the EU system, namely the recognition that “the municipal law 
of any Member State […] and Community law constitute two separate and distinct 
legal orders”.32  In effect, pluralism implies the coexistence of autonomous and valid 
sources of law, i.e., of different legal orders, within one and the same social field, that 
is a territory or a population.33  Pluralism therefore challenges the monopoly of the 
state as the unique and ultimate source of authority and enables the emergence of a 
transnational form of law resting on a disconnection between the concepts of state 
and constitution.  In turn, the peace of such coexistence is guaranteed by 
cooperative mechanisms preventing conflicts between incompatible rules.34  At EU 
level, by establishing “institutions endowed with sovereign rights”35, Member States 
not only created a binding system of shared powers and responsibilities backed by “a 
complete system of legal remedies”,36 but also provided for a system of express and 
implied cooperation rules including, at primary level, the preliminary ruling procedure 
and the principles of precedence and direct effect and,37 at secondary level, 
countless instruments determining the law applicable to a great variety of legal 
situations and organizing the meso-level of governance where the EU and the 
Member States interact through their respective institutional structure in the 
implementation of common policies.   
Yet the EU transnational system is not one of “pure” pluralism because it is 
fundamentally incomplete and emanates from the common volition of a diversity of 
nation states, each embodying a specific political compact reflecting particular social 
                                                 
30
 For a recent thorough discussion, see, eg.‘Le Pluralisme’ in Archives de Philosophie du droit, vol. 
49, (2005), p. 499. 
31
 Notably by promoting the idea of the integration of EU law into the laws of each Member State (see, 
eg., Case 6/64, Costa v E.N.E.L., pp. 593, 594 and 596). 
32
 See the first preliminary ruling issued by the Court of Justice in Case 13/61, van Rijn, section A.  
33
 See, eg., R. Michaels, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’, Duke Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, n°259, (July 2009,) 3.  
34
 See, generally, M. Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism, above. 
35
 Case 26/62, van Gend & Loos, above, p. 12. 
36
 Case 294/83, Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament, [1986] ECR p. 1339.   
37
 For a recent discussion of precedence as a conflict rule, see H. G. Hofmann, ‘Conflicts and 
Integration: Revisiting Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal II’,, in: M. P. Maduro and L. Azoulai, The Past 
and Future of EU Law (Hart Pub. Oxford, 2010), pp. 62-66. 
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choices and cultural traditions.  Consequently, the hybrid nature of the EU system 
carries particular constraints in terms of legitimation, which mandate the EU to live 
with, tolerate and indeed embed and experiment that diversity into its actual praxis.  
As explained hereinafter, the Union has precisely endeavoured in recent years to live 
by and deliver on that ontological requirement in the exercise of its competences, 
including of its historical commitment to market integration.38  Before moving on, 
though, it is worth emphasizing anew the density of the cooperative interactions 
between the EU and national levels of government so that pluralism in the EU system 
is hardly one of closeness and separation.  Moreover, it rests on a far-reaching 
institutional structure and elaborated constitutional principles, which condition and 
ensure the consistency of and compliance with its outcome.39  
 
A. Affirmation of Pluralistic Concerns  in EU Internal Market Policies 
 
A more “holistic approach” integrating the pluralistic interests/preferences of the 
European polity is emerging in the recent European Commission’s review of its 
positive integration programme40. In its Communication on the Citizen’s Agenda, the 
                                                 
38
 Already in the early 1990’s, in introducing his essay on New Directions in European Community 
Law, Snyder contended that under a supranational umbrella, the Union ‘increasingly recognises the 
validity of diverse national policies’ so that, in effect, ‘[C]ommon market law, in a fragmented Europe, 
is thus mainly a co-ordinating device’ (F. Snyder, New Directions in European Community Law, 
(Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1990), p.18. Likewise, Mattera has presented on various 
occasions in the past the principle of mutual recognition as a means allowing for the accommodation 
of national diversities (see, eg., A. Mattera, ‘L’article 30 du traité CEE, la jurisprudence ‘Cassis de 
Dijon‘ et le principe de la reconnaissance mutuelle – Instruments au service d’une Communauté plus 
respectueuses des diversités nationales’, RMUE, issue 4 (1992), 13 ; A. Mattera, ‘L’Union européenne 
assure le respect des identités nationales, régionales et locales en particulier par l’application et la 
mise en œuvre du principe de reconnaissance mutuelle’, Rev. Drt. U.E., issue 2 (2002), 217-239.  Of 
course Snyder was right to point to early instances of instruments relying heavily on the coordination 
of national rules (for a glaring example, see also Regulation 1408/71 on the application of social 
security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community [1971] OJ L 
149/2); yet the elaboration of those instruments remained centralized and coordination was arguably 
the result of regulatory constraints rather than the outcome of a conscious political choice.  Likewise, 
mutual recognition, even though it carried the potential of giving transnational relevance to domestic 
requirements, was for a long time commanded centrally and poorly organized, with a consequent lack 
of certainty and effectiveness.    
39
 To use the terminology of Delmas-Marty, cooperative interactions in the EU system are ‘verticalized’ 
(see Ordering Pluralism, above. p.17).   
40
 On the ‘holistic approach’, see I. Lianos, ‘Shifting Narratives in the European Internal Market: 
Efficient Restrictions of Trade and the Nature of ‘’Economic’’ Integration’, EBLR, 21(5) (2010), 705-
760. On the importance of ensuring citizens’ support for the project of the Internal Market and the 
need to reconcile the single market and the social and citizens’ dimension in the context of the Treaty 
logic of ‘highly competitive social market economy’ see M. Monti, A New Strategy for the Single 
Market – At the service of Europe’s Economy and Society (9 May 2010), Chapter 3. 
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Commission noted the importance of economic integration “in making the EU 
stronger globally” but also emphasized the importance of the value of solidarity in 
achieving the objectives of the Union41. In accordance with the objectives set by the 
Constitutive Treaties42, the Union should aim to promote a higher quality of life, social 
cohesion, environmental protection, by ensuring “citizen’s existing rights of access to 
employment, education, social services, health care and other forms of social 
protection across Europe”43. In order to achieve these aims, the Commission 
acknowledges the importance of working in partnership with national governments. 
There are various manifestations of this shift of narrative on the objectives of 
economic integration in Europe. As it is explained in the Commission’s 
Communication on a “single market for 21st century Europe”, the Internal Market 
must be “more responsive to the expectations and concerns of citizens”44. It follows 
that the Single Market policy goes “hand in hand with social and environment policies 
to contribute to sustainable development goals” and needs to “encompass a strong 
social and environmental dimension”45. The Commission’s Staff Working Document 
accompanying the Communication, also notes that the Single Market brought 
benefits to citizens “in the form of more choice, higher quality and lower prices” but 
“times have changed and Single Market policy should change accordingly, to ensure 
that it responds to the needs of today’s citizens”46. Finally, in its recent 
Communication “Towards a Single Market Act”, the Commission seems to have 
taken stock of the integration of the concept of “social market economy” in the Treaty 
of Lisbon and proposed to conduct an “in-depth analysis of the social impact of all 
proposed legislation concerning the single market”47. 
The implications of this rhetorical shift are important. First, as the Commission 
acknowledges,  
                                                 
41
 Communication from the Commission to the European Council – A Citizen’s Agenda, COM(2006) 
211 final. 
42
 Article 3(3) TEU (after Lisbon), former Article 2 TEU. 
43
 Communication from the Commission to the European Council – A Citizen’s Agenda., at 5. 
44
 Communication for the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Single Market for the twenty-
first Century, COM(2007) 724 final, at 3 (hereinafter Single Market for the twenty-first Century 
Communication). 
45
 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
46
 Commission Staff Working Document, Instruments for a modernized single market policy (MSMP), 
SEC(2007) 1518, at 5. 
47
 According to the most recent Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a Single 
Market Act, COM(2010) 608 final, at 23. 
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“(m)arket opening and economic integration have social and environmental 
impacts, which must be factored in - both in Europe and abroad. This requires 
a better assessment of the impact of decisions and a better collective capacity 
to anticipate, foster and manage changes implied by greater opening and 
technological developments. This also implies getting market prices to reflect 
their real costs on society and the environment, as well as making citizens 
more aware of the social and environmental impacts of their consumer 
choices”48. 
It is further recognized that “the ultimate objective of all economic activity is to 
provide the goods and services that citizens require in the most efficient manner”49. 
The conception of “citizens as consumers” becomes “clearly central to the Single 
Market”, which should take “more seriously” into account the distributional impact of 
the Internal Market policies, its social effects and the consumer/citizen side50. The 
new approach to positive market integration will be more evidence-based and 
“impact-driven”, relying on a number of tools, also employed in competition policy, 
such as sector inquiries, or specific to the Single Market policy, such as the 
“consumer markets scoreboard” in order to provide information on how markets 
perform “in terms of economic and social outcomes for consumers, and where 
intervention may be needed”51. The Commission will use an “optimal mix of 
instruments”, that would combine more flexible approaches to legislation (e.g. 
Lamfalussy process) and non-binding tools (e.g. codes of conduct), as well as 
competition law and policy tools (e.g. competition advocacy) in a “synergetic manner” 
to achieve greater welfare gains for the European citizens/consumers52. 
Second, there is a move from a “more legalistic approach to a more economic 
approach” that focuses on both static (consumer choice, lower prices, better 
environmental standards) and dynamic (innovation) efficiency53. As the Commission 
explained in the Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication,  
                                                 
48
 Single Market for the twenty-first Century Communication, p. 10. 
49
 Commission Staff Working Document, p. 17. 
50
 Ibid, p. 17. 
51
 Ibid, p. 18. 
52
 Ibid, p. 8-15. 
53
 See F. Ilzkovitz, A. Dierx, V. Kovacs and N. Sousa, European Commission DG Economic and 
Financial Affairs, European Economy, Steps towards a Deeper Economic Integration: the Internal 
Market in the twenty-first century A Contribution to the Single Market Review, No 271, (January 2007,) 
pp. 17-18. 
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“(i)n the past, Single Market policy was mainly about ‘integration through 
law’. The aim was to remove legal barriers to cross-border trade. This was 
achieved through ‘negative’ integration measures and ‘positive integration 
measures’ […] In today’s context, legal integration can no longer be the Single 
Market’s sole or primary ambition”54. 
The emphasis put on regulatory differences as a sign of success of the completion 
of the Single market is no longer the leitmotiv of the internal market project. For the 
Commission, “policies need to be rethought so as to ensure that markets are not only 
integrated but can function well – thereby improving consumer welfare and raising 
productivity”55. The different social, economic and political context of various Member 
States may require different institutional choices for satisfying consumer welfare, for 
example, if this is the goal to achieve. 
 Third, the Commission recognizes the importance of developing an “inclusive” 
perspective that will consider the interaction of the Internal Market project with other 
EU “and national policies, among others to address adjustment costs”56. The 
interaction with other policies does not go one way only. Inge Govaere observes that 
“social, environmental, and public health policy instruments are drafted with due 
regard to the internal market principles of non-discrimination and market access”, so 
as to avoid “an ex post interference of internal market law”; she cites the 
Commission’s Communication on “Opportunities, Access and Solidarity: Towards a 
New Social Vision for 21st Century Europe”, drawing “attention to issues of market 
access and non-discrimination in the social field” 57. The Lisbon Treaty has also 
added a broad horizontal integration provision in Article 9 of the TFEU stating that 
“(i)n defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into 
account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the 
guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high 
level of education, training and protection of human health”58. Such broad policy 
integration provision did not exist in the previous Treaties, albeit in some specific 
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areas, such as environmental protection59. The inclusion of these provisions should 
prompt the Commission and arguably the Courts to grant more importance to 
broader public interest concerns than the facilitation of intra-community trade. 
The success of the “holistic approach” requires, however, important institutional 
changes in particular for the interaction between public authorities at the EU, the 
national and/or local levels. Enhancing administrative cooperation between the 
different players is a key priority in the Commission’s New Internal Market strategy. 
Following a paradigm that has flourished in the enforcement of competition law, 
national administrations are included in a variety of networks60 in the area of goods, 
services, consumer protection, social policy area, where they exchange information 
with each other61. The Services Directive is a good example of this new approach 
that promotes cooperation, communication and exchange of information, by including 
an entire section (Chapter VI) on administrative cooperation between Member 
States, and by providing mechanisms for mutual assistance and joint monitoring62. 
There is the perception that national action is a complement to EU action. The 
idea of a “partnership” between Member States and the EU Institutions, of a “joint 
venture” in which Member States “have a shared stake” is the new rhetoric advanced 
by the Commission63, in opposition to the prevalent perception that Member States 
and the Union have antagonistic interests, in particular with regard to the 
enforcement of the Internal Market rules. This partnership approach “goes beyond 
the already established cooperation in a number of single market policy areas” and 
“requires establishing and maintaining closer cooperation within and between the 
Member States, and with the Commission, in all areas that are relevant for the single 
market”; It also “implies that Member States assume shared responsibility for and 
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therefore a more proactive role in managing the single market”64. The Member States 
are encouraged to “carry out regular evaluation and assessment of national 
legislation to ensure full compliance with single market rules and in so doing keep 
under review any use of exemptions or derogations provided for in existing single 
market rules”65. 
The holistic approach also requires the broadening of the stakeholder’s 
involvement in the management and monitoring of the Internal Market. The creation 
of European consumer centres, the “points of single contact” introduced by the 
Services Directive66, the creation of consumer complaints networks or Single market 
centres or the inclusion of users in advisory panels increase considerably the 
possibilities of participation of consumers in the management of the internal market 
and the integration of pluralistic concerns in the design of the internal market polices 
and their objectives.  
 
B. Affirmation of Pluralistic Concerns in the EU Internal Market Case Law 
 
As noted, it is postulated that the affirmation of pluralistic concerns has permeated 
up to the most sacred sanctuary of the logic of unity and of the one-dimensional 
imagery of market integration as entailing the removal of national barriers to trade, 
namely the case law of the Court of Justice.  To perceive a possible evolution in the 
internal market case law, while remaining mindful of the limits inherent to the 
casuistry, it is useful to go back in history to the early 1970s, following the completion 
of the transitional period.   
Then, in van Binsbergen, the Court endowed the equivalent of Article 56 TFEU, 
which prohibits “restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Union”, with 
direct effect so that it “may therefore be relied on before national courts, at least in so 
far as they seek to abolish any discrimination against a person providing a service by 
reason of his nationality or of the fact that he resides in a Member State other than 
that in which the service is to be provided”.67  At the time, the application of Article 56 
TFEU was therefore premised on the existence of a direct discrimination, even 
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though the Court hinted that an obstacle to trade could also derive from requirements 
“which may prevent or otherwise obstruct the activities of the person providing the 
service”.68 The Court then carved an exemption for those restrictions which “have as 
their purpose the application of professional rules justified by the general good – in 
particular rules relating to organization, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision 
and liability – which are binding upon any person established in the state in which the 
service is provided”.69  In turn, the assessment of such exemption was to be carried 
out “taking into account the particular nature of the services to be provided”.70  Like 
several of the early services cases, van Binsbergen involved a residence 
requirement, in casu for legal representatives other than attorneys, which was held 
contrary Article 56 TFEU “if the administration of justice can satisfactorily be ensured 
by measures which are less restrictive, such as the choosing of an address for 
service”71.   
In the following years, in particular in the post-Cassis de Dijon era, i.e., the 1980’s, 
the Court of Justice endeavoured to clarify the sequencing of its analysis and to 
broaden the scope of Article 56 TFEU, that is of the range of restrictions capable of 
falling within its ambit.  In a stream of insurance cases, for example, residence and 
licensing requirements were found to “constitute restrictions on the freedom to 
provide services inasmuch as they increase the cost of such services in the State in 
which they are provided”.72  Those restrictions may however be justified by 
“imperative reasons relating to the public interest” if they are “applied to all persons 
or undertakings operating within the territory of the state in which the service is 
provided”, i.e., in a non-discriminatory fashion, if they actually protect “the interests 
which such rules are designed to safeguard”, i.e., appropriate, if “the public interest is 
not already protected by the rules of the sate of establishment”, i.e., equivalence, and 
if “the same result cannot be obtained by less restrictive rules”, i.e., necessity.73  This 
presentation may appear somewhat misleading, though, as the sequencing was not 
as clear by the time, but at least all elements that came to constitute the internal 
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market test were present.  The notion of mutual recognition acquired particular 
significance in the late 1980’s, both at the level of the definition of the restriction and 
of its possible justification.  Thus in Stichting Gouda, for example, a restriction was 
found to arise out of the “application of national rules which affect any person 
established in the national territory to persons providing services established in the 
territory of another Member States who already have to satisfy the requirements of 
that State’s legislation”, i.e., creating a so-called double burden.74  In the same case, 
the Court came to exclude the possibility of justifying the national rules a quo, 
regulating advertising on cable television, “if the requirements embodied in that 
legislation are already satisfied by the rules imposed on those persons in the 
Member State in which they are established”.75 The reasoning, which may appear 
cyclical at first sight, was later clarified in Säger. 
Indeed, in the early 1990’s, Säger confirmed the expansion of Article 56 TFEU to 
non-discriminatory restrictions, thus moving toward a market access standard, and 
induced thereby a convergence of the test applicable to services with the one 
applicable to goods at the time.  Thus the prohibition of barriers to trade in services 
was to cover not only direct discrimination “but also the abolition of any restriction, 
even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of 
other Member States, when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of 
a provider of services established in another Member States where he lawfully 
provides similar services”.76  The question from then on would rest with the 
substance of the term “impede” or “impediment to” the cross-border supply of 
services.  Would the application of any domestic requirement to foreign-based 
services providers amount to a restriction?  Or does it have to display certain plus-
factors and, in the affirmative, which ones?  An increase in the costs of the supply of 
services, but then, in what proportion?  Eventually, Säger also clarified the stages of 
the proportionality assessment applicable to the justification phase of the internal 
market test: the domestic requirement(s) must be appropriate (i.e., “objectively 
necessary”) to ensure compliance with an imperative reason relating to the public 
interest that is not protected by the rules to which the service provider is subject in its 
Member State of establishment (equivalence), and it must not exceed what is 
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necessary to attain those objectives.77  Over the same period, the Court of Justice 
further confirmed that Article 56 TFEU covers restrictions, including of a fiscal nature, 
affecting not only the suppliers but also the beneficiaries of services if they “operate 
to deter” those seeking a particular service, such as pension, life invalidity or 
sickness insurance coverage, “from approaching insurers established in another 
Member State”.78  Again, the actual contours of that deterrence requirement would 
remain a source of endless questioning from then on.   
The convergence between the internal market test applicable to goods and 
services will last but with one important exception.  In 1995, the Court declined 
indeed to extend to the area of services its Keck and Mithouard case law excluding 
non-discriminatory measures governing selling arrangements from the scope of the 
free movement of goods.79  The relevant case, known as Alpine Investments, 
pertained to the prohibition of cold calling for the purpose of selling investment 
products; contrary to selling arrangements, the Court found, the prohibition at issue 
actually did “directly affect access to the market in services in the other Member 
States [where customers are located] and is thus capable of hindering intra-
Community trade in services”.80  Indirectly, the Court refused therefore to distinguish 
between the service and the way it is supplied, while at the same time expressly 
relying on the notion of “market access” that has come to qualify that of trade 
impediment.  In passing, it also confirmed that restrictions to cross-border trade in 
services can emanate equally from the State of destination and from the State of 
origin of the supplier.81  In the examination of the necessity of the prohibition on cold 
calling in light of the public interest in protecting investor confidence in the domestic 
financial markets, the Court upheld the measure and expressly allocated regulatory 
jurisdiction to the Member State from which the telephone calls were made by 
judging that it was “best placed to regulate cold calling”.82  In doing so, it insisted on 
the practical constraints relating to the control of calls emanating from another 
Member State and based its assessment on the effectiveness of such control.   
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This historical overview ends in the late 1990’s/early 2000’s with the Smits & 
Peerbooms case where the Court confirmed that “the special nature of certain 
services does not remove them from the ambit of the fundamental principle of 
freedom of movement” so that even social security rules – in casu a prior 
authorization scheme conditioning the benefit of the reimbursement of health 
treatments incurred abroad – are subject to the discipline of Article 56 TFEU.83  The 
Court then examined the scheme both from the point of view of the beneficiary and 
the one of the potential suppliers and while confirming the association between the 
notions of restriction and deterrence in relation to the former, volunteered a rather ill-
defined standard for the determination of the scope of Article 56 as precluding “the 
application of any national rules which have the effect of making the provision of 
services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services purely 
within one Member State”.84  In retrospect, the question arises whether such 
statement does not represent the ultimate negation of regulatory diversity in so far as 
the cross-border supply of services would seem necessarily “more difficult” and/or to 
“involve additional costs” from a regulatory point of view, than doing so within a single 
Member State.    
With the above background in mind, the following sections explore the latest case 
law of the Court of Justice in the area of services, with incursions beyond, with a view 
to highlighting an evolution in the application of the internal market test revealing an 
emerging praxis of pluralism.  The two main stages of the test are reviewed 
successively: first the interpretation of the notion of restriction to the freedom to 
provide services and second the assessment of the proportionality of the 
restriction(s) at stake in light of the alleged public interest to safeguard.  
 
1. Restriction Criteria 
 
A study of the most recent services case law of the Court of Justice reveals a 
lasting ambiguity as to the content of the notion of “restriction” to trade.  To be sure, 
those cases involving direct discrimination or poorly concealed protectionist 
measures are relative straightforward, especially when they are reminiscent of past 
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practices such as residence requirements or discriminatory taxation.85  Situations 
where the supply of a particular service is prohibited or entrusted in a single operator 
are relatively unproblematic.86  Cases pertaining to classic issues such as the posting 
of workers abroad have raised concerns related to the type of practice found to 
constitute a restriction, such as collective actions, but less as to the reasoning 
concerning the restrictive effects thereof.87  Conversely, the circumstances in which a 
measure applicable without distinction may be deemed to amount to a restriction – 
i.e., market access cases – continue to raise questions.  Even if indicia of a possible 
“turn to pluralism” are more apparent in the review of the proportionality of 
requirements aimed to safeguard public policy interests, two developments are worth 
mentioning at this stage.   
 
1.1 A margin of diversity? 
     
The recent Italian auto insurance case, which involved the obligation for insurance 
provider to contract with any vehicle owners domiciled in Italy, offers a good starting 
point to illustrate the lasting ambiguity in the application of the market access 
criterion.88  The Court starts with a now widespread formula according to which “the 
term ‘restriction’ within the meaning of Article [56 TFEU] covers all measures which 
prohibit, impede or render less attractive the freedom of establishment or the 
freedom to provide services”.89  Interestingly, it then underlines that mere regulatory 
diversity, i.e., “the fact that other Member States apply less strict, or more 
commercially favourable, rules to providers of similar services established in their 
                                                 
85
 See, eg.: (i) Case C-546/07, Commission/Germany [2010] ECR I-not yet published, involving a 
residence requirement for those providers willing to conclude a works contract with Polish 
undertakings in order to provide services in Germany; and (ii) Case C-169/08, Presidente del 
Consiglio dei Ministri [2009] ECR I-not yet published, involving a local tax for stopovers made by 
aircrafts or boats operated by persons having their tax domicile outside the territory of the region of 
Sardegna.  
86
 See, eg.: (i) Case C-36/02, Omega [2004] ECR I-9609, para. 25, where the operation of a laser 
game ‘lawfully marketed in the United Kingdom’ was prohibited in Germany; or (ii) the Gaming cases 
such as Case C-42/07, Liga Portuguesa [2009] ECR I-7633, para. 52 and Case C-258/08, 
Ladbrokes/Lotto [2010] ECR I-not yet published, para. 16. 
87
 See, eg., Case C-341/05, Laval [2007] ECR I-11767 and Case C-438/05, Viking [2007] ECR I-
10779.   
88
 Case C-518/06, Commission/Italy [2009] ECR I-3491. See, also, eg., Case C-258/08, 
Ladbrokes/Lotto [2010] ECR I-not yet published, para. 15.  
89
 Ibid, para. 62.  
 22 
 
territory”, is not constitutive of a restriction90.  That gesture toward the acceptance of 
a coexistence of different regulatory standards across the EU implies logically that a 
“margin of diversity” ought to be left to Member States within which their domestic 
rules are not likely to be found restrictive of cross-border trade.  Thus, only those 
measures found to “affect access to the market for undertakings from other Member 
States” would be deemed to hinder intra-Community trade.91  In turn, the Court of 
Justice considers that market access is affected in the case a quo because, by 
“oblige[ing] insurance undertakings which enter the Italian market to accept every 
potential customer, that obligation to contract is likely to lead, in terms of organisation 
and investment, to significant additional costs for such undertakings”.92  In particular, 
they “will be required to re-think their business policy and strategy, inter alia, by 
considerably expanding the range of insurance services offered”.93  The margin of 
diversity left to Member States appears therefore particularly thin and the notion of 
restriction to market access to be more a matter of degree – of “scale” of “changes 
and costs”94 - than kind.  In turn, that criterion continues to leave the scope of Article 
56 TFEU wide open, quite unsettled and, in effect, a matter of case by case 
appreciation for the Court of Justice, which seeks to retain thereby the potential for 
allocating regulatory jurisdiction.  This is equally apparent from a recent 
establishment case, for example, in which the Court found that a rule making the 
opening of new roadside service stations in Italy subject to minimum distances 
requirements between service stations affected access to the activity of fuel 
distribution.95 
The notion of margin of diversity can be found in other recent cases relating, e.g., 
to demographic limitations on the establishment of pharmacies in Spain.96  In that 
case, the Court of Justice derived such margin from the “power of Member States to 
organise their social security system” and to “determine the level of protection which 
they wish to afford to public health and the way in which that level is to be 
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achieved”.97  Yet, the affirmation of that “measure of discretion” did not seem to affect 
the actual assessment of the notion of restriction, which involved, it is true, a classic 
system of prior authorization.98  Moreover, in another case involving “the power of the 
Member States to organise their social security systems”, the Court appeared to 
deny any margin of diversity by taking the view that Article 56 TFEU “precludes the 
application of any national rules which have the effect of making the provision of 
services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services entirely 
within a single Member State”.99  That case related, however, to a difference of 
treatment in the coverage of patients authorized to receive hospital care in another 
Member State.  The same terminology was used in a case involving a different 
recovery period for taxes due on assets held inside or outside the territory of The 
Netherlands, which was deemed to “make it less attractive for […] taxpayers to 
transfer assets to another Member States in order to benefit from financial services 
offered there”.100  Eventually, the “more difficult” standard was merged with that of 
market access in a case involving the prohibition of advertising on national television 
networks for medical and surgical treatments carried out in private health care 
establishments in Italy.101  Earlier on, in Rüffert, the Court held that a mere difference 
in the minimum rates of pay imposed in the country of supply of services and in that 
of establishment was such as to impose “an additional economic burden that may 
prohibit, impede or render less attractive the provision of their services in the host 
Member State”.102    
As noted, the Court of Justice appears more inclined overall to give operational 
significance to the notion of margin of diversity, i.e., tolerance for the coexistence of 
different regulatory systems across Member States, at the level of the proportionality 
review.103  In contrast, at the prior level of the assessment of the existence of a 
restriction to trade, references to regulatory diversity, notably in relation to measures 
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applicable indistinctively, seem to have little impact on the interpretation of that 
concept, which continues to be associated with the loose notion of market access.  
The indeterminacy of that notion is further illustrated by the Mobistar case involving 
municipal taxes on mobile communications infrastructures (e.g., masts and 
antennae), which the Court interpreted as falling outside the scope of Article 56 
TFEU.104  Its reasoning started with a classic reminder of the fact that measures 
indistinctively applicable may still amount to a restriction of cross-border trade if they 
are “liable to prohibit or further impede the activities of a provider of services 
established in another Member State”.105  It then resorted to a strict reading of Article 
56 TFEU as precluding “the application of any national rules which have the effect of 
making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the 
provision of services purely within one Member State”.106  It further added a third 
premise to its reasoning, namely that “measures, the only effect of which is to create 
additional costs in respect to the service in question and which affect in the same 
way the provision of services between Member States and that within one Member 
State, do not fall within the scope of Article [56 TFEU]”.  That last statement appears 
difficult to reconcile with other cases, where the additional costs incurred by services 
providers due to domestic requirements in the host Member States were found 
constitutive of a restriction.  Yet, the Court also held in Mobistar that there was 
“nothing in the file to suggestion that the cumulative effect of the local taxes 
compromises freedom to provide mobile telephony services”, thereby hinting that, 
conversely, such cumulative effect could form the basis for a restriction.  Then, again, 
the question arises of the magnitude of the cumulative costs necessary to form a 
restriction – i.e., when does a measure loses its neutrality to become restrictive – and 
of the dissatisfaction of a solution leaving that assessment in the hands of the Court 
of Justice, on a case-by-case basis.   
At this stage, the above findings suggest the following three considerations.  First, 
the Court of Justice appears unwilling to limit the scope of Article 56 TFEU and of its 
own power to review the opportunity of national regulations affecting the supply of 
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services, in a context of underdevelopment of the internal market in that important 
field of the economy.  Second, the lack of established limitations to the scope of 
Article 56 TFEU shows the limits, paradoxically, of an internal market test based on 
the objective of removing national barriers to trade, for it does not reflect the variety 
of circumstances, demands and contexts presiding over the enactment of domestic 
regulations.  Third, it is often argued that the two parts of the internal market test are 
intertwined or even interdependent so that an allegedly “light” restriction would be 
more prone to justification, and vice-versa.  Even if it may carry some truth from an 
empirical perspective, as apparent from some of the cases reviewed hereinafter, this 
truism remains problematic from a normative point of view and is of little help in 
identifying the narrative underlying the European economic integration process.  
 
1.2 Taxing diversity? 
 
In tracing signs of a greater tolerance of the Court of Justice for the coexistence of 
different regulatory standards, a second notable development in the recent internal 
market case law, with immediate consequences this time, relates to the Court’s 
refusal to allocate regulatory jurisdiction in double taxation cases.  Leaving the area 
of services to enter that of free movement of capital allows indeed for an interesting 
illustration of the pluralist hypothesis formulated above.   
In essence, the Court was asked in various cases whether Article 63 TFEU 
prohibited the double taxation of dividends, i.e., the taxation of the same income in 
the country of origin of the income, by deduction at source, and then in the country of 
residence of the taxpayer as part of his revenues without providing for the possibility 
of setting off the former against the latter.107  Even though the cases involved 
situations of double fiscal burden, susceptible of affecting investment decisions, the 
Court refused to find a restriction on the movement of capital between Member 
States in the absence of “any distinction between dividends from companies 
established in [e.g., Belgium and dividends from companies established in another 
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Member State” as to the tax rate applicable in the taxpayer’s country of residence.108  
Conversely, it considered that the situation resulted from the mere “exercise in 
parallel by two Member States of their fiscal sovereignty” and that preventing double 
taxation in those cases would “amount to granting a priority with respect to the 
taxation of that type of income to the Member State in which the dividends are 
paid”,109 which it was not prepared to do.    
To justify its reluctance, the Court of Justice emphasized that direct taxation falls 
within the competence of the Member States, that it is for each Member State to 
organise its tax system and to define the tax base and the tax rate applicable to the 
taxation of dividends and,110 in particular, that “no uniform or harmonisation measure 
designed to eliminate double taxation has yet been adopted at Community law 
level”,111 with the consequence that “Member States retain the power to define, by 
treaty or unilaterally, the criteria for allocating their powers of taxation, particularly 
with a view to eliminating double taxation”.112  In other words, in the absence of “any 
general criteria [provided for in Community law] for the attribution of areas of 
competence between the Member States in relation to the elimination of double 
taxation”, it is “for the Member States to take the measures necessary”.113 
The solution adopted by the Court of Justice in those cases is somewhat 
surprising in view of its past internal market case law, which included various 
attempts at palliating for a lack of legislative activity.  Likewise, it is common ground 
that no “nucleus of sovereignty” is beyond the reach of Union law.114  Yet, the 
reasoning of the Court suffers little ambiguity: in the absence of any measure 
adopted at EU level with a view to preventing double taxation, generally, Article 63 
TFEU does not require giving precedence to one regulatory solution, e.g., taxation at 
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source, over another, e.g., taxation at the place of the taxpayer’s residence.  Is the 
Court suddenly stretching – i.e., taxing – the boundaries of regulatory diversity?  A 
comparison with the Laval case reveals a possible willingness to defer to the 
legislature those cases involving policy choices in areas where no consensus at EU 
level has emerged.115  Thus, in Laval,116 the Danish and Swedish Governments 
submitted that the right to take collective action in the context of negotiations with an 
employer fell outside the scope of Article 56 TFEU because, pursuant to Article 
153(5) TFEU, the “Community has no power to regulate that right”.117  Yet, the Court 
held that the exercise of the right to collective action was to take place in compliance 
with EU law and therefore that it could not be excluded from the domain of freedom 
to provide services.118  In effect, Laval involved alleged restrictions to the posting of 
workers abroad, a matter regulated by Directive 96/71/EC thus reflecting a 
consensus reached previously at EU level,119 the interpretation of which was 
precisely at stake.   
The hypothesis of a greater deference for diversity in areas where no regulatory 
competence has been conferred upon or exercised by the Union is further explored 
hereinafter.  Arguably, that deference is the sign of an evolution in the core praxis of 
the Union toward greater tolerance for the coexistence of varying regulatory 
standards.  It is also consistent with a greater emphasis put on decentralized and/or 
participative/reflexive policy-making processes, and generally with a pluralist account 
of the narrative underlying European economic integration.  Likewise, it is not 
excluded that it may be linked to a qualitative evolution in the nature of the questions 
put to the Court and a greater awareness of the possible implications of its rulings for 
Member States, including for their resources and, as a corollary, their redistributive 
powers.  Furthermore, it might be construed as a propensity for taking competences 
(more) seriously in echo to concerns voiced by various national actors over more 
than fifteen years, and thus as part of a response to challenges over the legitimacy of 
the Union as a regulatory and political body.    
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2. Proportionality Review   
 
As noted, indicia of a possible “turn to pluralism” are more apparent from the 
proportionality branch of the internal market test, particularly at the level of the 
equivalence and necessity assessments, which have historically involved an inquiry 
as to whether the public policy interest pursued by the restriction to trade: (i) is not 
already satisfied by the rules imposed on the supplier in his country of establishment; 
and (ii) cannot be achieved by less restrictive means.  This is not to say that no 
development has affected the application of the adequacy portion of the 
proportionality review.  To the contrary, recent case law testifies of a stricter analysis 
of the “consistent and systematic” character of the pursuit of the alleged justification 
ground(s).  The application of that criterion appears to have been decisive in 
determining the outcome of various – including prominent – recent cases.  For 
example, in Rüffert, the Court of Justice took issue with the fact that the higher rate of 
pay at issue was deemed necessary to protect construction workers when they are 
employed in the context of public works contracts but not in the context of private 
contracts.120  In Corporacion Dermoestetica, it pointed to the inconsistency of rules 
prohibiting the advertisement of medical and surgical treatments on national but not 
on local television networks.121  Likewise, in the area of establishment, the Court 
highlighted in Blanco Pérez the need to determine whether demographic limitations 
on the opening of pharmacies sought “in a consistent and systematic manner to 
ensure that the provision of medicinal products to the public is reliable and of good 
quality”.122  And in the recent stream of gaming cases, emphasis was clearly put on 
whether restrictions were suitable for achieving objectives, e.g., of consumer 
protection, “inasmuch as they must serve to limit betting activities in a consistent and 
systematic manner”.123  In effect, with greater flexibility displayed in the equivalence 
and necessity inquiries as a result of a higher tolerance for regulatory diversity, the 
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test of adequacy has acquired particular prominence in recent years and rose to 
become a key aspect of the proportionality review, to the point of overshadowing the 
necessity requirement.  The present section endeavours to substantiate that claim.   
The starting point of the proportionality review in many recent services cases 
testifies of a willingness to depart from the fixed objective of Europeanization of 
regulatory law, that is of promoting at any rate the emergence of a new European 
majoritarian view aimed to break the path-dependence of actors from national 
systems.124  Thus, in the Italian auto insurance case, for example, the Court of 
Justice made the following general proposition: “it is not essential, with regard to the 
proportionality criterion, that a restrictive measure laid down by the authorities of a 
Member State should correspond to a view shared by all the Member States 
concerning the means of protecting the legitimate interest at issue”.125  That 
language is clearly reminiscent of Omega, where the Court acknowledged that “the 
specific circumstances which may justify recourse to the concept of public policy may 
vary from one country to another and from one era to another” and that “it is not 
indispensable in that respect for the restrictive measure issued by the authorities of a 
Member State to correspond to a conception shared by all Member States as regards 
the precise way in which the fundamental right or legitimate interest in question is to 
be protected”.126  In other cases, such as Liga Portuguesa, a similar finding to the 
effect that “[T]he mere fact that a Member State has opted for a system of protection 
which differs from that adopted by another Member State cannot affect the 
assessment of the need for, and proportionality of, the provisions enacted to that 
end” was rooted both in the absence of harmonization at EU level in the field of 
games of chance with, as a corollary, the freedom “for each Member State to 
determine in those areas, in accordance with its own scale of values, what is required 
in order to ensure that the interests in question are protected”, and in the “significant 
moral, religious and cultural differences between the Member States”.127  
Interestingly, those considerations displaying a principled tolerance for regulatory 
diversity are not limited to the area of services, but can also be found in 
establishment and free movement of goods cases.  Thus, in Blanco Pérez, already 
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discussed, the Court started its proportionality review with the observation that “the 
fact that one Member State imposes more stringent rules than another in relation to 
the protection of public health does not mean that those rules are incompatible with 
the Treaty provisions on the fundamental freedoms” or at least “is not decisive for the 
outcome of the cases before the referring court”.128  Similarly, in the Italian Trailers 
case, the Court of Justice found that “[I]n the absence of fully harmonising provisions 
at Community level, it is for the Member  States to decide upon the level at which 
they wish to ensure road safety in their territory” and “the way in which that degree of 
protection is to be achieved”, so that “the fact that one Member State imposes less 
strict rules than another Member State does not mean that the latter’s rules are 
disproportionate”.129  
The immediate consequence of the above premise is, again, the recognition of a 
“margin of diversity” to Member States in the exercise of their regulatory powers.  As 
the Court stated in Omega, again: “the need for, and proportionality of, the provisions 
adopted are not excluded merely because one Member State has chosen a system 
of protection different from that adopted by another State”.130  At the stage of the 
proportionality review, however, that margin of diversity translates immediately in the 
recognition that “[T]he competent national authorities must […] be allowed a margin 
of discretion within the limits imposed by the Treaty”,131 or, stated otherwise, that the 
diversity of national preferences entails “a margin of appreciation” for Member 
States.132  Even if the sequence of the internal market test embeds by essence a 
margin of discretion mechanism, providing for an additional national margin of 
appreciation in those cases characterized by the absence of regulatory consensus at 
EU level, as translated in EU-wide instruments, and/or in areas marked by profound 
moral, religious or cultural considerations, discloses the existence of a diversity of 
review standards and thus the emergence of a pluralist approach to the management 
of regulatory diversity.  As Delmas-Marty observes, “[P]roviding for a national margin 
of appreciation is the key to ordering pluralism” in so far as “[O]n the one hand, it 
expresses the centrifugal dynamic of national resistance to integration” and “[O]n the 
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other, since the margin is not unlimited but bounded by shared principles, it sets a 
limit, a threshold of compatibility that leads back to the centre (centripetal 
dynamic)”.133  In practice, the grant of an additional margin of appreciation is 
reflected directly in the operation of the equivalence and necessity inquiries 
embedded in the proportionality review of national restrictions to cross-border trade.  
 
2.1. Equivalence in question 
 
The possible impact on the operation of the equivalence inquiry of the recognition 
of a broad margin of appreciation for national authorities is particularly apparent from 
the series of recent cases involving the gaming/gambling sector.  Thus, in the 
Placanica and Ladbrokes/Lotto cases, the Court takes as a premise that such margin 
ought to ensure Member States the freedom of designing “their policy on betting and 
gambling according to their own scale of values and, where appropriate, to define in 
detail the level of protection sought”.134  In Liga Portuguesa, the Court seems to have 
gone further by suggesting that the margin also ought to affect the implementation of 
the proportionality test in so far as the latter would then be carried out “solely by 
reference to the objectives pursued by the competent authorities of the Member 
State concerned and the degree of protection which they seek to ensure”, thus based 
on a self-centred perspective focusing on the internal consistency of the domestic 
system.135  In doing so, the Court appears to acknowledge that the public policy 
interests put forward in support of the restrictions at issue justify a particularly broad 
margin’s width.  
In that context, it is not difficult to anticipate the restrictive interpretation given to 
the principle of equivalence: “A Member State is therefore entitled to take the view 
that the mere fact that an operator […] lawfully offers services in that sector […] in 
another Member State, in which it is established and where it is in principle already 
subject to statutory conditions and controls on the part of the competent authorities in 
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that State, is not a sufficient assurance that national consumers will be protected 
against the risks of fraud and crime”,136 as determined by the host Member State in 
accordance with its “own scale of values”.137    
Some commentators contend that the above reasoning amounts to a “blanket 
rejection of the application of the principle of mutual recognition in relation to online 
gambling services” and “may potentially challenge the whole philosophy underlying 
[the application of Article 56 TFEU].138  Others take the view that the condition of 
equivalence was simply not fulfilled, notably because of the extreme diversity of 
domestic legislations in the field of games of chance.139  In a recent Opinion, 
Advocate General Mengozzi sheds some useful light on the tolerance shown by the 
Court of Justice for the lack of equivalence between the national regulatory 
frameworks at issue in the above cases.140  In particular, while acknowledging a 
departure from the principle of equivalence as formulated in Säger,141 he points to 
the exclusion of the gaming sector from the scope of the Services Directives and to 
the grant of off-shore gaming licences by the authorities of Malta or Gibraltar as 
expressions of a lack of mutual trust between Member States in that field, whereas 
such mutual trust is the precondition for the mutual recognition of gaming licences 
within the Union.142  In other words, Advocate General Mengozzi implies that trust 
cannot be postulated but needs to be translated in operational and effective trust-
building mechanisms of a cooperative nature in order to enable mutual recognition 
and the progressive convergence of national systems.143  The link between the 
management of regulatory diversity and [system] trust is at the core of the attempt to 
reformulate the inner èthos of European market integration, as provided for in section 
II, below.  
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2.2. Necessity, burden of proof and effectiveness 
 
Affirmations of a greater tolerance for regulatory diversity in cases involving policy 
areas characterized by the prevalence of domestic preferences over the expression 
of a consensus at EU level, aim particularly at the operation of the necessity inquiry: 
“the fact that some Member States have chosen to establish a [regulatory] system 
different from that introduced by [another Member State…] does not indicate that [the 
system] goes beyond what is necessary to attain the objectives pursued”.144  
Endowing Member States with an additional margin of appreciation while reviewing 
the proportionality of public policy justifications for domestic restrictions to trade 
impacts the necessity inquiry at two levels: (i) the definition of the burden of proof 
borne by Member States; and (ii) the assessment of the practical constraints faced 
by Member States in guaranteeing the effectiveness of the protection of the public 
interest(s) sought.  Overall, those developments testify of a relaxation of the 
necessity inquiry, i.e., of a more lenient assessment compatible with the enhanced 
discretion left to Member States.     
 
(a) The proof of the absence of less restrictive means 
 
The performance of the necessity inquiry, as the last step in the internal market 
test, is often perceived as the most extreme form of counter-majoritarianism at EU 
level and is naturally prone to controversies – who is the Court to second-guess the 
opportunity of the means set forth by the Member States in pursuance of public 
policy objectives? In preliminary ruling cases, the Court of Justice leaves to the 
national court the actual assessment as to whether the domestic rule does not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective sought.  Yet, it does often provide 
guidance, more or less subtlety, to its national counterpart, at least as to the level of 
scrutiny to be exercised and, conversely, the burden of proof incumbent upon the 
relevant Member State.145   
Precisely, the Court of Justice adopted a particularly deferential position in some 
recent cases as to the intensity of the burden of proof carried by Member States. 
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Thus, “whilst it is true that it is for a Member State which relies on an imperative 
requirement to justify a restriction within the meaning of the [EU Treaties] to 
demonstrate that its rules are appropriate and necessary to attain the legitimate 
objective being pursued, that burden of proof cannot be so extensive as to require 
the Member State to prove, positively, that no other conceivable measure could 
enable that objective to be attained under the same conditions”.146  While it is not 
exactly clear how that standard is supposed to translate in practice, it clearly 
indicates a willingness to refrain from questioning the means used to implement 
public policy objectives, to the extent that they appear “adequate”, and the 
effectiveness thereof.    
   
(b)The effectiveness of the protection of the public 
interest(s) sought 
 
 The second notable evolution in the necessity inquiry associated with the 
recognition of a margin of appreciation consists in a greater sensitivity displayed 
toward the effectiveness of the means deployed to ensure the protection of the public 
interest(s) sought.  In the online gaming cases, for example, the Court of Justice 
pointed to the “substantial risks of fraud” caused by the “lack of direct contact 
between consumer and operator” to substantiate the practical difficulties for the 
Member State of establishment to police effectively the practices of games suppliers 
on a host market and, as a result, to uphold the grant of exclusive rights to operate 
games of chance via the internet to a single operator, subject to the supervision of its 
domestic public authorities.147  This approach is of course evocative of the reasoning 
adopted by the Court in the Alpine Investment case, discussed above, as to the 
effective means to police cold calling practices.148  Similarly, in recent free movement 
of goods cases, the Court also underlined, in its review of the proportionality of 
prohibition or restrictions on the usage of certain goods, “that Member States cannot 
be denied the possibility of attaining an objective […] by the introduction of general 
and simple rules which will be easily understood and applied […] and easily 
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managed and supervised by the competent authorities”.149  Again, those 
considerations show a greater deference for Member States’ discretion in devising 
the means adapted to the satisfaction of the level of protection set in accordance with 
domestic preferences.    
 
* 
 
The above section has attempted to identify signs of the emergence of a logic of 
pluralism in the core praxis of the EU system – economic integration, as driven by the 
ultimate guardian of the unity of the Union, namely the Court of Justice.  At this 
stage, the following conclusion surfaces: in those cases involving indistinctively 
applicable measures pertaining to policy areas characterized by an absence of EU-
wide consensus, as embodied in a legislative instrument adopted at EU level, the 
Court appears to display a principled tolerance for regulatory diversity,150 which 
translates in two interrelated phenomena: (i) a reluctance to proceed to a 
(re)allocation of regulatory jurisdiction and/or to define regulatory policy; and (ii) the 
recognition of a broad(er) margin of appreciation to Member State in the exercise of 
its regulatory powers.  In doing so, though, the Court seems to exhibit a preference, 
at least in the area of services, for a more lenient proportionality review over a 
limitation of the scope of the notion of restriction to cross-border trade, which remains 
unsettled but also enables the Court to secure its prerogative of reviewing the 
opportunity of national regulations and/or to avoid creating safe harbours capable of 
creating or evolving into loopholes in the EU economic integration system.  The 
above findings call however for three remarks.  
First, they are contingent on limitations inherent to the casuistry – i.e., on the 
nature, scope and timing of particular cases – and, at this stage, remain based on a 
review of a limited sample of about thirty cases.  The ambition is therefore certainly 
not to express decisive conclusions but to highlight a tendency, which still carries 
meaning in view of the far-reaching positions held in the past by the Court of Justice, 
specifically in the field of market integration.  The identification of the precise causes 
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underlying that tendency is a subject for debate; overall, though, they appear to 
originate in an acknowledgment of existing limits to the interpretation of the market 
integration provisions of the EU Treaties, possibly informed by past experiences and 
a greater awareness as to their broad potential in affecting preference (re)formation 
and the design and implementation of redistributive policies.   
Second, the above findings suggest a turn toward a more holistic approach in the 
application of the market freedom provisions revealing greater attention paid to 
values other than the trade and, consequently, a willingness to depart from the one-
dimensional paradigm of the erosion of national barriers to trade and its corollary, the 
isolation of the economic and social spheres.  As a result, they trigger a fundamental 
question, that of the transformation of a market-building into a [“market-deepening”] 
project conditional on mutually-agreed solutions, even if of a cooperative nature.  
Consequently, wouldn’t that transformation both reveal and require a reformulation of 
the inner ethos of European economic integration, if not of the matrix of the whole EU 
system?  Part II below explores one possible avenue to address that question.       
Third, there is no doubt that protectionist measures remain inefficient and that their 
removal (will) remain a focus of the economic integration project, yet the above 
findings reveal the complexity of the notion of efficiency and the difficulty of devising 
principles capable of harnessing that complexity.  The notion of margin of 
appreciation constitutes an important tool in that respect, in that it allows for a 
gradation in the intensity of the review of national regulations depending on the 
nature thereof and policy interests enshrined therein.  In essence, the sequence of 
the internal market test itself embeds a margin of discretion mechanism; hence, by 
granting Member States an express “margin of appreciation”, the Court of Justice 
adds in fact width to that original or pre-existing margin of discretion.  In turn, the 
Court reveals a practice of varying and adjusting the margin’s width from case to 
case, i.e., the existence of a plurality of review standards, and discloses thereby a 
pluralist approach to the management of regulatory diversity.  Such an approach 
carries great potential but is not immune from risks in terms of legal certainty and 
thus for the formal validity of the market integration rules.  For Delmas-Marty, 
operating a pluralist approach is indeed dependent on two methodological conditions: 
“transparency, which requires [international judges] to elaborate on the criteria 
serving as filters; and discipline, which implies that they respect these filters”.  This is 
an exacting process, in particular on the part of a jurisdiction composed of judges 
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with very different backgrounds.151  Still, the stakes are high for, according to 
Delmas-Marty, “judicial transparency and discipline, reasoning and self-limitation are 
the ingredients for realising the European Union’s motto, ‘united in diversity’”.152  
Moreover, “[C]ommitting to playing this game with determination and discipline” is 
nothing less than “a way of showing that the union of peoples, including in other 
regions and at other levels, is not necessarily synonymous with uniformity, and that 
the universalism of values can adapt to the curves in space and time”.153 
 
III. Pluralism, economic integration and the emergence of an èthos of 
mutual trust 
 
The concept of “economic integration” has been a marking element of post-war 
economic thinking over trade and international economic relations154. The concept 
suffered from an “abundance of mutually contradictory definitions”155, perhaps 
because of its dual essence: integration can be conceived of as a process, 
encompassing “measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic units 
belonging to different national states”, as well as a state of affairs, represented by 
“the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies”156. Its 
meaning has been framed by the tensions between the “liberalist” (market friendly) 
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and the dirigist (state intervention friendly) ideals that characterized the political 
landscape of the post-war era157.  
The development of the twin concepts of negative and positive integration, coined 
by Tinbergen in 1965158, and seen as complementary tools to remove discrimination 
and restrictions of movement in order to enable the market to function effectively, 
while promoting other broader policy objectives, was seen as a necessary 
compromise in order to make “economic integration” acceptable to both camps. The 
different “stages of integration”, identified by Balassa159, as well as the distinction of 
the concept of “integration” from that of “cooperation”160, were also inspired by the 
same narrative of removing barriers and achieving regulatory sameness to the point 
that they attracted the criticism that their final stage, the unitary state, was 
“misconceived” for being inspired “by a centralist rather than federal state model”161. 
Despite the absence of an authoritative definition of the term, Fritz Machlup noted in 
1977 that a wide consensus existed as to the three essential conditions for economic 
integration: “economic integration refers basically to division of labour”, “it involves 
mobility of goods or factors”, “it is related to discrimination or non-discrimination in 
the treatment of goods and factors”162. 
The main difficulty with this conceptualization of integration is that it does not 
accommodate the need for pluralism and diversity. By bringing in the economics of 
federalism as an additional analytical tool valuing diversity, economic integration 
theorists attempted a re-conceptualization of the term that will make it more politically 
acceptable to the EU member States and to the expected aspirations of the newly 
formed European citizenry163. However, this was a risky analytical venture: once the 
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need for diversity brings into the concept of economic integration a broader set of 
values than the more instrumental one of removing barriers to exchange, the concept 
loses its distinctive character and becomes confined to that of efficiency (broadly 
defined as the satisfaction of preferences of the different units of the entity). The 
question then boils down to identifying a measure of success for this kind of 
“economic integration”. One could possibly imagine integration as a continuous and 
never-ending process of balancing of the different interests in presence (integration 
as a process) but such a concept of integration will be devoid of purpose and thus 
semantically empty, not to mention unfit from a policy prescription perspective. 
One could turn instead to study institutions of governance, under the assumption 
that they may provide useful insights as to the interaction between the process of 
economic integration and the concept of pluralism. In that regard, the development of 
legal rules and informal arrangements in the EU can be viewed as part of a broad 
effort to mitigate the risks generated by the existence of interaction and 
interdependence between different regulatory systems. The more diverse the 
regulatory regimes are, the higher the risks involved. The process of managing these 
risks leads to the emergence of various governance mechanisms or tools, which 
present discrete characteristics. 
Trade in services is probably the area where more differences lay across the 
regulatory regimes of EU Member States, as a result of the recent liberalisation of the 
sector and the lack of expansive enforcement of the negative integration rules.  It is 
also the area where the application of the principle of the freedom of movement led 
to the emergence of various governance mechanisms that defy the paradigm of 
positive (harmonization) versus negative integration (market access principle or 
national treatment). The hypothesis defended in this study is that the existence of a 
variety of governance mechanisms may be explained by the need to manage 
regulatory pluralism.  
This analytical step becomes possible if we embrace a new paradigm of 
integration based on the concept of trust. To support this theory, one could note the 
revolution brought to the conceptual edifice of “economic integration” by the principle 
of “mutual recognition”, a major innovation introduced by the European judiciary in 
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Cassis de Dijon. Perceived initially as a tool of negative integration working alongside 
the broad “obstacles to trade” approach in defining restrictions of trade, the principle 
of mutual recognition has evolved towards a mechanism of re-allocation of 
jurisdictional authority, “a hybrid at the intersection of both processes” (market 
access and harmonization)164. Based on mutual trust, among regulators, mutual 
recognition has become since the “core paradigm” of “economic integration”, the 
“starting assumption” before determining the need for “a policed national treatment” 
or “harmonization”165. This evolution displaces the uni-dimensional focus of 
integration theory on the erosion of barriers to exchange that underpinned the 
dilemma between negative and positive integration. Mutual recognition defies this 
paradigm and suggests a different perspective on economic integration, conceived of 
as a process of building increased levels of “institutional-based” trust (or “system 
trust”) between actors interacting across national boundaries. The emphasis on the 
constitutive element of trust integrates some degree of marginalist thinking in 
integration theory that contrasts with the overall significance the classic economic 
integration theory accords to the erosion of barriers to exchange, to the point that the 
different stages of integration are conceived as a continuum going from the existence 
of barriers (and the resulting pluralism of regulatory cultures) to the absence of 
barriers to trade (and the resulting uniformity of the single market).  
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A.The emergence of discrete governance mechanisms  
 
Governments regulate their economies for various reasons as explained by public 
interest, interest group or capture theory of regulation166. According to the principle of 
territoriality, these domestic policies apply to the territory controlled by the host 
Member State and affect any economic operator that is economically active in its 
jurisdiction. The group of affected economic operators is not only limited to domestic 
service-providers but also extends to foreign service-providers that offer their 
services in the host Member State. Domestic policies will thus produce some form of 
extraterritorial effect, in particular as service-providers established in other Member 
States (home State) may incur increased costs, as a result of the regulation imposed 
by the host State. First, the regulation of the host State may affect the objectives 
pursued by the home State to have access (for the benefit of economic operators 
established in its territory) to the host State’s market. Secondly, the regulation of the 
service-providers by the home State might affect the policy goals of the host State, 
as long as the foreign service-providers established in the home State have access 
to the host State’s market and the host State’s regulation is rendered ineffective by 
the fact that some economic operators are established outside its jurisdiction. Indeed, 
it is theoretically possible for each State to adopt unilaterally measures in order to 
mitigate the negative externalities to its domestic policies generated by foreign 
service-providers. However, in some circumstances this is not possible, for example 
because of the important costs of monitoring economic operators established outside 
its own jurisdiction or the ineffectiveness of controls, or even desirable, from a policy 
perspective. In these instances, cooperation with the foreign jurisdiction would be 
more effective in order to deal with these negative policy externalities.  
It follows that the existence of negative domestic policy externalities that have 
cross-border effects constitutes the main reason for the emergence of a situation of 
cooperation between States. Moravscik observes that  
“(n)ational governments have an incentive to co-operate where policy 
coordination increases their control over domestic policy outcomes, permitting 
them to achieve goals that would not otherwise be possible. This situation 
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arises most often where co-ordination eliminates negative international policy 
externalities”167. 
In contrast, positive policy externalities, that is policies that confer benefits on 
foreign groups in order to promote domestic policies, are often of little interest for 
international trade agreements or regimes,. The “purely internal situation” case law of 
the ECJ for restrictions of trade that disadvantage nationals168 provides a good 
illustration of this lack of interest to positive cross-border externalities. The 
explanation is simple and relates to the absence of an incentive to cooperate in a 
situation of positive policy externality: “(o)nly where the policies of two or more 
governments create negative policy externalities for one another, and unilateral 
adjustment strategies are ineffective, inadequate or expensive, does economic 
interdependence create an unambiguous incentive to co-ordinate policy”169. 
By entering in cooperation with other States, the host States incur risks. 
Cooperation is often initiated by conditional promises by which each State declares 
that it will act in a certain way under the condition that the other State acts in 
accordance to its own commitments. This relation of reciprocity may take different 
forms. Bilder explains, 
“(i)n general, a nation’s decision to enter into an international (cooperation) 
[…] can be said to involve considerations of risk when that nation believes that 
its commitment to the (cooperation) […] may, depending on the occurrence or 
non-occurrence of particular future events or outcomes as to which it is 
uncertain or in doubt, expose if to an eventual final outcome which is harmful 
in that its costs exceed its benefits. Typically, risk will be thought of in terms of 
probabilities”170. 
According to the same author, States may be concerned by one of the following 
broad types of risk: 
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“(1) The risk that the nation may later decide, for extraneous reasons, that it 
no longer wishes to participate in the agreement. For example, it may wish to 
get out of the agreement because some other nation has offered it a “better 
deal”. 
(2) The risk that the intrinsic utility of the agreement to that nation may 
decline to the extent that the prospective benefits from the agreement no 
longer equal or exceed its costs. For example, the cost of performing its 
promise may increase or the value of what it has been promised may decline; 
(3) The risk that the other nation concerned may not perform as promised. 
For example, a nation’s treaty partner may completely withhold performance 
or may “cheat”171. 
The existence of risk will require recourse to various risk management techniques, 
such as “provisions for easy withdrawal (from the mutual commitments), guarantees, 
timing of performance, verification and inspection, escrow, hostage, buffer zones, 
dispute settlement, sanctions”…172 One could envision these different risk 
management techniques as forms of regulation of risk. The term regulation should 
not be perceived in its usual hierarchical dimension, in opposition to voluntary forms 
of governance such as networks, but as involving some form of action on the 
variables generating risk with the intention to manage uncertainty. The types of risks 
involved, the fact that the State will be risk-averse or risk-prone, the availability of 
information about the partner, the probability of occurrence of the risks or the 
existence of important opportunity costs in case of non-cooperation would impact on 
the choice of the institutional alternative to manage risk, and thus on the governance 
mechanism of the particular cooperative relationship.  
In the context of a cooperation aiming to mitigate negative domestic policy 
externalities with cross-border effects, different governance mechanisms will emerge. 
It has been argued that there are three main institutional alternatives or governance 
mechanisms to manage risk in international trade law173.  
The first is the mutual commitment not to employ specific types of domestic 
regulation (a negative obligation). The conditional promises of the States may relate 
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to the implementation of a national treatment rule. The latter prevents either State 
(home and host) from applying discriminatory standards to cross-border services; the 
State is otherwise free to set any standard that is not directly discriminatory to the 
foreign service-providers.174 In the field of services, the ECJ moved progressively to 
expand the conditional promise of non-discrimination (or the application of a national 
treatment rule) to include a market access rule175, where States commit not to adopt 
regulation that would affect the market access of foreign service-providers and 
establish barriers to trade, whatever that term means176. The starting point for both 
these rules is the existence of some form of negative cross-border domestic policies 
externalities. As noted, these arise “where the policies of one nation impose costs on 
the domestic nationals of another177, thereby undermining the goals of the second 
government’s policies”178. The main difference between the principles of national 
treatment and that of market access is the type of international negative domestic 
policy externalities that are of normative and practical interest, for the application of 
the prohibition principle. If, as it seems to be the case in the EU, the normative 
framework of the cooperation aims to achieve “the elimination of all obstacles to 
intra-community trade in order to merge the national markets into a single market 
bringing about conditions as close as possible to those of a genuine internal 
market”179, anything causing a potential disparity between legal orders and thus 
different economic conditions would be of interest to define the cross-border negative 
domestic policy externalities that will be the focus of the prohibition rule. In theory, 
the list of prohibited practices can include different domestic environmental pollution 
standards or other regulatory barriers imposing costs on cross-border service 
provision, competitive devaluation and different employment conditions leading to 
higher or lower labour costs, irrespective of the fact that the same rules apply to 
domestic firms.  
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Cooperation (in the form of a mutual commitment to a market access rule) can be 
particularly difficult to reach in situations where the governments have divergent 
policies, because of the different preferences to which they have to respond in the 
domestic arena. The variety of preferences translates a different mix of societal 
interests, power struggles and bargaining positions between interest groups and the 
existence of a plurality of institutional structures across societies reflecting these 
interests. The objective of inter-state cooperation becomes thus to find a way to 
internalize negative policy externalities, that is, to restrain the domestic interests that 
affect foreign service-providers and to devise an optimal division of the burden of 
adjustment. Cooperation emerges when the costs of co-ordination are outweighed by 
the common interest in reducing negative policy externalities (for example when 
cooperation generates gains to powerful interest groups, if one adopts the capture or 
public choice theory of regulation, or more generally to the public interest, in 
conformity with the public interest theory of regulation)180.  
Second the market access rule can be distinguished from the national treatment 
rule by focusing on the degree of internalization of cross-border negative domestic 
policy externalities. National treatment allows for the achievement of the goals of 
domestic policy, as long as this does not lead to a discrimination against cross-
border service providers. Thus, a national treatment rules does not internalize all 
negative policy externalities, as cross-border service-providers will still incur the costs 
of conforming to a different regulatory structure. In comparison, a broad market 
access rule has less potential to achieve the goals of domestic policies, but enables 
the internalization of negative externalities to a higher degree, as national rules are 
prohibited whenever they impose barriers to the market access of cross-border 
services. There are various interpretations of the concept of trade barriers, but 
whichever is adopted, the scope of the prohibition rule is broader than under the 
national treatment rule. 
Because of its potential breadth, with regard to the type of domestic regulations 
that it brings within its scope, the application of a pure market access rule is not 
politically achievable or even desirable in the EU. First, not all barriers to trade fall 
within the scope of the EU market access rule. For example, competitive devaluation 
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is not prohibited for countries that do not participate to the Eurozone and the 
regulation of labour markets is largely outside the realm of the negative integration 
provisions of the Treaties. Second, EU Member States may restrict the freedom to 
provide cross-border services if this is justified by various recognised public interest 
objectives which are not protected by the home state’s regulation to the same 
standard (efficient restrictions of trade)181. Should this be the case, the host State’s 
regulation will apply, subject to the proportionality principle. The latter will uncover 
situations of opportunistic behaviour, where the State would be arguing a public 
interest justification with protectionist intent. Should this public interest justification 
prove successful, following judicial assessment, the host member state may maintain 
measures that are restrictive of trade. The application of the market access rule is 
therefore conditioned by specific circumstances, in particular the absence of a 
legitimate justification for the restriction of trade. We will refer to this principle as 
“conditional market access”. 
The possibility of exceptions to the application of the market access rule, offered to 
the host State, is further qualified in the EU by an asymmetrical allocation of the 
burden of proof between the home and host State that disfavours the host State. This 
is achieved by the principle of equivalence, which creates a presumption that the 
home State’s regulatory system internalizes all the cross-border negative policy 
externalities that it produces. It is on the host State to prove that this is not practically 
the case, for example because of some fundamental differences, which may relate to 
diverse regulatory cultures and policies determining mutual perceptions of regulatory 
effectiveness, different risk assessments, or more broadly the absence of “regulatory 
compatibility” between the two regimes182. The principle of equivalence attenuates 
the possible neutralisation of the market access principle by a frequent and 
inconsiderate use of exceptions. It constitutes a form of mutual recognition, as, by 
convening that their relations are governed by this principle, the home and the host 
state mutually recognize the compatibility of their regulatory systems. 
The principle of equivalence constitutes thus a discrete governance mechanism 
compared to the market access and national treatment rules, as it involves a positive 
                                                 
181
 I. Lianos, ‘Trust, distrust and economic integration: efficient restrictions of trade and the evolution of 
the law of the Internal market’, UCL Global Law Research Paper Series (forth. 2011). 
182
 K. Nicolaidis and M. Egan, ‘Transnational market governance and regional policy externality: why 
recognize foreign standards?’, JEPP , vol. 8 issue 3, (2001) 454-473, p. 458. 
 47 
 
obligation imposed to the host States to “recognize” the regulatory system of the 
home State. This involves a presumption of equivalence of the preferences 
maximised by the home State’s regulation to those satisfied by its own regulation that 
is attached to it. 
The practical assessment of the application of the equivalence principle is often 
left to a third independent party, the courts. As it is rightly observed by Maduro, the 
courts do not assess whether the different national legislations are identical183. The 
principle of equivalence, operating as a presumption dismisses the need to integrate 
this assessment in the judicial control. What the courts can do, however, is to define 
the negative policy externalities to foreign interests that need to be internalized for 
the principle of equivalence to operate fully.  
Here, opinions diverge. Some authors argue that the role of the courts is to ensure 
the “virtual representation” of all foreign interests that might be affected184. It follows, 
that courts, such as the European Court of Justice, will not simply look to the 
regulatory compatibility of the home and host states’ regulations, but will impose a 
solution which introduces the “EU interests of market integration in the national 
decision-making process”185. This definition of the principle of equivalence requires 
from the Courts to intervene in order to virtually represent all the omitted foreign 
interests. This can take either the form of a proper balancing test that will evaluate 
the local benefits and the foreign costs and then assess their respective weight, or an 
“institutional malfunctions” test186.  
Other authors question the premises of the “virtual representation” argument and 
advance instead a “local/global equivalence” argument187. According to this view, 
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foreign interests are often accounted for by local interests in decision-making. The 
interests of the local consumers might indeed be affected by a regulation that favours 
local producers and harms foreign producers/suppliers. But a strict environmental 
regulation that is indistinctly applicable will also affect local suppliers of products 
whose production is not compatible with the stricter environmental standards and 
who might be either obliged to increase their costs considerably and thus lose market 
share or to exit the market. It might also affect local consumers that are unable to buy 
the more expensive environmentally-friendly products. These local interests will 
oppose their home state’s regulation, as its effect will decrease their welfare, and by 
doing so, they will represent the foreign interests in the domestic political process. In 
other words, there is a vicarious consideration of the foreign producers’ interests by 
the integration in the analysis of local consumers’ and/or some local suppliers’ 
interests.   
The assumptions about the internalization of cross-border negative domestic 
policy externalities being exactly the opposite, each theory leads to a different degree 
of discretion for national regulatory systems and in fine to a different end-point in their 
interaction. The virtual representation argument theory will be vindicated if, through 
the judge’s intervention, the regulation under examination will internalize all the 
negative policy externalities of a domestic regulation to foreign interests: in other 
words foreign interests will be integrated by judicial decision to the domestic weighing 
of interests, thus breaking the boundary between foreign and domestic interests: the 
“foreign” and the “domestic” sphere becoming one. In contrast, the local/global 
equivalence theory will internalize some negative policy externalities to foreign 
interests, presumably only those accounted for by local interests. The distinction 
between foreign and domestic will thus still be relevant, as it is possible that a 
different weighing of interests develops across jurisdictions, depending on the 
bargaining power of the various societal interests. As a result, there would be 
regulatory diversity, not sameness.  
A third institutional arrangement/governance mechanism to deal with risks is for 
the parties to the cooperation to agree on common rules/standards of protection 
across jurisdictions, in other words to write a contract, implemented by a third party, 
which remains outside the control of the home or the host State. We thus move from 
regulatory compatibility to regulatory sameness or regulatory harmonization, at least 
as far as regulatory values are concerned. The same rules apply to all jurisdictions. 
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Harmonization is the preferred governance mechanism where the national 
treatment or market access principle cannot be enforced successfully. This may be 
caused from the fact that there are significant differences between the regulatory 
values of the home and the host States, which cannot be resolved on a case by case 
basis by the courts applying the market access rule or the principle of equivalence. 
There are various reasons for this. Courts may not have the legitimacy or the power 
to resolve the distributional conflicts between the winning and the losing societal 
interests in the home and host state, the task being delegated to the political process. 
The application of the market access rule may be unsuited for sectors subject to 
technically complex regulation that requires an important amount of information and 
continuous supervision of the service provider. Furthermore, if there is economic 
interdependence between the jurisdictions, there is a high occurrence of cross-border 
negative policy externalities. In this case, harmonization may reduce transaction 
costs. Transaction costs include “the cost of collecting information on the amount of 
welfare benefits188” the home or the host state might gain in order to determine their 
position as to the internalization of negative policy externalities in each case following 
the application of the market access rule. It also involves the costs of the ad hoc 
judicial examination of the justifications proffered by the State or the application of 
the principle of equivalence. The choice of harmonization as the adequate 
institutional framework will thus be a function of the comparison between these 
transaction costs and the costs entailed by harmonization189.  
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However, the existence of discrete institutional alternatives cannot be limited to the 
principles of (pure) market access (national treatment), (conditional) market access 
(principle of equivalence) and harmonization. The terminology of “mutual recognition” 
that now dominates the discourse about governance of economic integration projects 
indicates that those different institutional alternatives form part of a continuum,190 
which can be further creatively expanded with the emergence of new forms of 
governance, building on these foundational blocks.  
There are various forms of “mutual recognition”. Some authors, like Pelkmans, 
oppose “judicial mutual recognition” to “regulatory mutual recognition”191. Whilst 
“judicial mutual recognition” proceeds to an ad hoc and ex post assessment of State 
measures, depending on the individual cases brought to the courts, “regulatory 
mutual recognition”, relies more on a systematic scrutiny of existing measures, by 
means of a screening mechanism, early warning systems (including the obligation to 
notify new measures), administrative cooperation among national authorities and 
mutual evaluation procedures, thus falling sort of the rigidity of the “harmonization” 
conceptual category. Mutual recognition can thus be perceived as a form of “new 
governance” mechanism192. “New governance” was an appropriate catch-all slogan 
to conceptualize the unlikeness of the “new” “regulatory mutual recognition” to the 
more established “harmonization” category. By emphasizing the soft and somehow 
more collaborative and voluntary, rather than hierarchical and binding character of 
the former193, its ambition was to describe a new phenomenon rather than to provide 
categorical and conceptual clarity. There was no attempt to advance and test 
explanations on the causes of this shift from old to “new” governance methods that 
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would have led to informed predictions on the evolution of EU governance in various 
fields 
May be, this is due to the fuzziness of the “mutual recognition” category. As 
Poiares Maduro once noted, the principle of mutual recognition conceals a dual 
nature194. First, it may constitute a governance mechanism, in the sense that it 
generates a process of regulatory competition and decentralisation that can be 
distinguished from harmonization195, as previously explained. Secondly, it operates 
as a conflict of law rule. Wolfgang Kerber with Roger van den Bergh have 
convincingly argued that mutual recognition aims to delineate the regulatory powers 
of jurisdictions and to test whether the traditional national regulatory autonomy is still 
defensible or if decentralization should be replaced by another allocation of 
regulatory powers that can either take the form of “centralization (including measures 
of harmonization) or a free market for regulations (free choice of law)196. As a conflict 
rule that determines which governance mechanism will prevail it cannot be a form of 
governance in itself197.  
Indeed, some formulations of the mutual recognition principle may lead to the 
extraterritorial application of the home State’s law, thus providing economic operators 
with a limited right to choose among different national regulatory regimes. The 
application of a country of origin principle, where the host State accepts without any 
conditions the regulatory standards of the home State (pure mutual recognition) can 
lead initially to a system of intense regulatory competition between States, as 
economic operators are free to experiment with different regulatory systems. A 
country of origin principle may thus be compared to a uniform choice of law rule, 
where the applicable regulatory standards are always those of the home state, 
notwithstanding the fact that the practice affects the host state’s domestic interests. 
The extraterritorial application of the home state’s law that results from the country of 
origin rule increases the likelihood of a race to the bottom, where different regulatory 
systems enter in a spiral of scaling down their mandatory requirements in order to 
improve their position in the regulatory competition game. Ultimately, this might lead 
                                                 
194
 M. Maduro, ‘So close and yet so far: the paradoxes of mutual recognition’ JEPP vol. 14 issue 5, (2007) 
814-825, 815. 
195
 S Schmidt, ‘Mutual recognition as a new mode of governance’, above, p. 667. 
196
 W. Kerber and R. Van den Bergh, ‘Mutual Recognition Revisited: Misunderstandings, 
Inconsistencies, and a Suggested Reinterpretation’, Kyklos 61 (2008), 447-465, 448. 
197
 M. Maduro, ‘So close and yet so far: the paradoxes of mutual recognition’, above, p. 815. 
 52 
 
to a unification of law and to harmonization, where the most “competitive” regulatory 
standard will prevail. Conflict of law rules can easily become instruments of 
harmonization and integration198.  
The decision to adopt choice of law as the optimal means of allocating regulatory 
competences between member States is based on the assumption that a market for 
regulation will effectively satisfy the various regulatory preferences. However, a 
market for regulation may generate externalities, the race to the bottom being an 
obvious example. The provision of a free menu of regulatory options to economic 
operators would in this case not satisfy some domestic interests favouring high 
quality of services, safety, consumer protection or environmental standards. These 
values may not be taken into account by the market mechanism, because the total 
gains to be made by satisfying the marginal consumers of regulation (foreign 
entrepreneurs) and some infra-marginal consumers of regulation (domestic interests 
favouring low prices) will be more important than the costs to infra-marginal 
consumers of regulation (domestic interests – consumers and entrepreneurs- valuing 
environmental protection, consumer protection, social welfare) that put these values 
higher than lower prices in their scale of preferences. A mandatory allocation of 
regulatory competences would be an option in this case. The decision-making may 
be (i) exclusively delegated to a third-party, (ii) shared between the affected 
jurisdictions, (iii) permanently delegated to one of them, home or the host State. The 
country of origin principle may be perceived as an example of the third option, the 
regulatory competence being exclusively exercised by the home State. It does not 
thus constitute a free menu choice of law system. One could certainly theoretically 
envision a country of the provision of services option, where regulatory competence 
will only be exercised by the host country and not by the home jurisdiction (for 
services that are cross-border). Such an option faces practical difficulties, because of 
the principle of territoriality in regulation and the difficulty to distinguish ex ante 
between services that are provided cross-border, where the home state’s regulatory 
regime will not apply, and services destined for the domestic market. There are also 
options (i) and (ii), which broadly correspond to the governance mechanism of 
harmonization and that of “managed mutual recognition”, where the parties to the 
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cooperation framework share the regulation of risks by effectively ensuring that 
negative cross-border policy externalities are internalized through mutual 
understandings concerning the required adjustments of the burden. 
With this conceptual framework in mind, the next section explores the regulation of 
trade in services in the EU and the different governance tools chosen for various 
sectors, with the view to highlight the emergence of hybrid governance tools that 
challenge the established conceptual categories of national treatment, market access 
and harmonization. The hypothesis is that this variety of governance tools 
exemplifies the efforts made in the EU to accommodate regulatory pluralism. 
 
B. A variety of governance tools in the area of services: adjustment to 
accommodate legal pluralism? 
 
 The area of the free movement of services constitutes an interesting natural 
experiment for testing this proposition. Governments regulate trade in services for a 
number of reasons: they may be motivated by the need to promote the provision of 
some services in the marketplace that, absent regulation, would have never been 
provided, they may want to address externalities arising from the existence of natural 
monopolies or relational bargaining power because of an informational asymmetry, 
they may have paternalistic concerns or pursue aims of distributive justice. The 
scope of negative policy externalities that are of concern for EU law is also broad, the 
market access rule operating under Article 56 of the TFEU covering all measures that 
have the potential to affect cross-EU trade. Consequently, the governance 
arrangements dealing with these negative externalities may swathe various sectors 
of the economy and affect large societal interests.  
 
1.The exclusion of the full operation of the principle of equivalence: the 
example of gambling 
 
As noted, the Court of Justice recognized in Liga Portuguesa the need for Member 
States to develop their own scale of values with regard to the application of 
paternalistic regulation in order to preserve social objectives or to reduce criminal 
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activity199. The fact that the Council has put in place a Working Party on 
Establishment and Services on the legal framework for gambling and betting, which 
provided extensive information on the legal regime of the different Member States in 
this area might explain the cautious approach followed by the Court. After all, it was 
clearly explained in the progress report published by the Swedish presidency that 
Member States should be free “to set the objectives of their policy on betting and 
gambling and, where appropriate, to define in detail the level of protection sought”200 
The Court could have applied the principle of equivalence as for all cases where 
Community harmonization has not been adopted. It chose instead a different starting 
point, that of the regulatory diversity of Member States. As explained in section I.B.2 
above, the result is that the burden of proof in proffering public policy justifications for 
measures restricting market access is now profoundly altered. Host States could 
dismiss an allegation of an Article 56 TFEU infringement by emphasizing the diversity 
of their regulatory regime: the once feared proportionality test is now to be carried out 
“solely by reference to the objectives pursued by the competent authorities of the 
Member State concerned and the degree of protection which they seek to ensure”201.   
This case exemplifies the emergence of a special category of judicial mutual 
recognition where the principle of equivalence does not operate, as it usually does 
under the framework established of the ECJ in Cassis de Dijon. This is not with the 
intention to promote gambling as an area of regulatory experimentation for Member 
States before making the choice of a more centralized or federal regulatory option. 
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The objective is clearly to accommodate the variety of societal choices across the 
Member States in the Union. 
 
2. Delegation to the private sector and self regulation (codes of 
conduct) 
 
In other instances regulation establishing barriers to trade is necessary to deal 
with market failure. Depending on which services sector comes into focus, the extent 
of regulation varies. Several factors such as increasing risks or the nature of the 
industry involved can determine the form of governmental action. In the sector of 
professional services, it might be necessary to maintain high professional standards 
and to ensure the quality of services for the benefit of the consumers. This regulation, 
pervasive in some economic sectors, is not always directly the fact of the State. It 
may emanate from a number of private professional associations/bodies to which the 
State has delegated the power to regulate professions. The definition of quality 
standards and other requirements for the exercise of professions is a highly 
information intensive task, requiring an expert knowledge of the social and economic 
context of the profession, the expectations of consumers, the existing social 
(informal) norms that govern the exercise of professions (reputation effects). The 
reality of the regulatory space is complex enough, rendering improbable the choice of 
a simple command and control regulatory instrument. The self-regulation of 
professions complicates also any effort of harmonization at the EU level. The 
traditional harmonization tools would have not adequately addressed the plurality of 
actors and interests represented in the regulation of the professions in the various 
Member States.  A different mechanism had thus to be chosen: European-wide 
codes of conduct.  
According to Article 37 of the Services Directive, 
“(m)ember States shall, in cooperation with the Commission, take 
accompanying measures to encourage the drawing up at the Community level, 
particularly by professional bodies, organisations and associations, of codes of 
conduct aimed at facilitating the provisions of services or the establishment of 
a provider in another member State, in conformity with Community law. 
This bottom-up approach emphasizes the involvement of the private sector and 
professional organizations/bodies across the Union, rather than interaction between 
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national regulators. It was indeed felt that European Codes of Conduct, drafted by 
the professional bodies would enable the pooling of expertise and specialised local 
knowledge on the minimum professional standards and would ensure quality across 
the Union. The pan-European codes of conduct could thus operate as a targeted 
trust-building tool accommodating the polyarchy of the regulation of the professions, 
where there is a multitude of national professional bodies involved. This approach 
has the dual effect of building more consumer trust on the quality of the services 
provided by professionals established elsewhere in the Union and of facilitating the 
interoperability of different regulatory environments. 
One could contrast the regulation of the professions with another sector of the 
economy, where there is intensive quality regulation, but with less regulatory actors 
involved in this process. In public procurement markets, regulation aims to attain 
greater allocative efficiency, while ensuring greater quality of services and the 
performance of universal service obligations. Contrary to the delegated self-
regulation of the professions, the regulation of procurement markets emanates 
directly from the State (it is not delegated to private bodies) and is horizontal in 
nature, as it applies to all sectors. It is also of relatively limited scope, as the 
standards imposed aim to preserve the transparency of the tender process and 
competition in the award of the contracts rather than specific and variable quality 
norms for each profession, as it is the case for the regulation of professions. The EU 
Directives that proceeded to the harmonization of the regulatory framework in this 
sector202 offer thus an important discretion to Member States in regulating the award 
process and in ensuring the provision of services of general interest. The choice of 
the instrument of the directive is justified by the relatively low knowledge and sector-
specific expertise requirements for the regulation of public procurement and the 
rather straightforward implementation process, compared to the difficulties that would 
have incurred the monitoring of the regulation of the professions at the European 
level, without the assistance of professional bodies and associations. 
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3. Balancing common standards and regulatory diversity by delegating 
to regulatory networks and agencies: the examples of energy and 
telecom regulation 
 
In other economic sectors, the pervasiveness and technicality of the regulation 
and subsequently the high intensity of expert knowledge required mandates the 
involvement in the EU harmonization process of national regulators. The process of 
developing interoperable standards across the Union requires their involvement. The 
aim is to share knowledge and to negotiate the development of common standards. 
The process is close to that of standard setting organizations, with the difference that 
in this case the participants to the standard setting are all stakeholders: Member 
States (national ministries and authorities, the Commission), business and industry 
representatives, consumer associations , not just the economic operators and that 
their cooperation takes place or continues after the common standards have been 
established. 
The development of EU harmonization in the regulation of utilities markets may 
provide a useful illustration of this cooperative partnership between Member States 
and between the Member States and the Union. For example, the Florence and the 
Madrid processes on the liberalization of the electricity and gas sectors in 1998 were 
thought as completing the implementation of the first liberalization directives of 1996, 
in view of the considerable opposition between the different Member States as to the 
degree of the opening of the sectors to competition and the dismantling of national 
monopolies203. When the early EU steps towards liberalisation were taken, utilities 
markets presented a heterogeneous configuration characterised by State ownership, 
vertical integration and monopoly. The Florence Electricity Regulatory Forum and the 
Madrid Gas Regulatory forum provided the platforms for informal discussions and 
exchange of ideas between the different stakeholders in order to ensure that the 
important differences that still separated the various domestic approaches could not 
                                                 
203
 P. D. Cameron, ‘Creating an Internal Market in Energy: How Can the tools be more effective?,’ 
Robert Schuman Centre, Policy Papers, 05/01, available at 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/staff/pcameron_publications_RSCAS_policy_paper.pdf One could 
also add the Citizen’s Energy forum, established in 2008 as a new regulatory platform based on the 
experience gained in the Florence and Madrid Forums. See,  
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/forum_citizen_energy_en.htm 
 58 
 
curtail the achievement of the EU Internal Market in this sector204. This objective was 
largely achieved. The involvement of the stakeholders through this informal 
mechanism was an essential trust-building tool that eventually led to the 
development of more “integrated” European standards, soon after the publication of 
the second liberalization package in 2003.  
Cameron explains that the strategic considerations of security of energy supply or 
access to fossil fuels have traditionally weakened the force of arguments for energy 
market integration in the EU, in particular for Member States that rely on imports of 
energy and gas, and may explain the “strong influence of public service 
considerations in the electricity and to a lesser extent the gas industry of the EU” that 
blocked the negotiations for a long time, in comparison to other regulated industries, 
such as telecoms205. In telecoms the Commission made use of the special powers 
given by Article 106(3) TFEU, which allows the issuance of directives without 
requiring extensive negotiations with the Council and the European Parliament. 
However, in other sectors – especially energy and post – the use of a similar strategy 
would have clashed with the pronounced political resistance of some Member States. 
The Florence and Madrid fora can thus be explained by the need of the specific 
sector for an extensive and continuous trust-building process between the different 
stakeholders, something that was not considered that important in the development 
of the EU framework in the telecom sector. 
More importantly, the cooperation between Member States and between the 
member States and the Commission continued even after the emergence of 
harmonized standards in these sectors. This is, in part, due to the specificities of the 
regulatory arrangements in the utilities sector. Electricity and telecoms have been 
traditionally regulated through public ownership or directly by government 
departments, less so by independent administrative authorities. Generally, with the 
main exception of the UK, there were initially no independent regulators in most of 
the EU Member States.206 Central governments were the exclusive rule-setters and 
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concentrated most of the regulatory powers. The choice of a government department 
to regulate often signalled that the objectives pursued by the State expanded beyond 
the usual focus of curbing the effects of market power and reducing negative 
externalities. A number of social or protectionist aims were also framing regulatory 
strategies.  
The absence of a clear mandate with specific objectives and priorities for each 
national regulator, in conjunction with the strategic dimension of these sectors made 
the development of regulatory interoperability and a level playing field between the 
different Member States an unachievable dream. Expanding the scope of the market 
and constraining national regulations with the implementation of EU competition rules 
would have been a possible option if the overall aim of the EU legislator was to 
dismantle the various national regulatory barriers to an Internal market for electricity. 
The establishment of a European federal regulator could have been another. None of 
these options was nevertheless chosen. Instead, the European legislator imposed 
the establishment, in each Member State, of independent national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs)207, which contribute to “the development of the internal market 
and of a level playing field by cooperating with each other and with the Commission 
in a transparent manner”208. The NRAs were also integrated in a European network 
of regulators, called “ERG” in telecoms and “ERGEG” in energy209, both founded in 
order to promote cooperation between regulators, to draft guidelines and policy 
proposals and, more generally, to promote cognitive convergence at the EU level210.  
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It is possible to conceive the involvement of independent administrative regulators 
as a credible commitment tool211 by the Member states that they will not adopt 
protectionist strategies in the future and that only regulatory measures that expert 
bodies such as national regulators judge as necessary for the normal operation of the 
industry (and justified by a market failure, externality or identifiable need to provide 
public services) will be adopted. Because of the nature of the European legislative 
process, Member States still enjoy, however, a high degree of regulatory autonomy. 
The directives merely set up a general framework that must be ‘transposed’ to the 
internal legislation of Member States. Whilst generally most – if not all – NRAs have 
broad duties and extensive powers to oversee their respective markets, their 
strategies and behaviour heavily diverge212. Their degrees of discretion are different; 
their objectives and priorities vary213, the scope of their jurisdiction is dissimilar (e.g. 
some have concurrent jurisdiction with antitrust authorities), and finally, their 
procedures to set tariffs are also very disparate.214 Certainly, the European 
Commission, as the main governmental principal, casts a “double shadow of 
hierarchy” over the sectoral governance agents (NRAs and the network of NRAs). 
This is achieved through the threat of further legislation and of enforcing EU 
competition law215, both options been employed effectively by the Commission216. 
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The recent third liberalization package in energy moved towards a more 
centralised governance structure217. This resulted in the creation of a formal agency 
in the energy sector, the ‘Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators’ 
(ACER)218, in charge of regulatory cross border issues and coordination of the work 
of NRAs. Likewise, the Commission launched a review of the current regulatory rules 
in the telecommunications sector in November 2007.219 The proposals for reform 
included the establishment of a European agency (the ‘Electronic Communications 
Market Authority’, ECMA) with powers to act centrally and coordinate actions of 
NRAs. The new package for electronic communications did not establish a strong 
central authority but introduced instead the Body of European Regulators for 
Electronic Communications (BEREC), which replaced the ERG as an exclusive 
forum of cooperation among NRAs and between NRAs and the Commission. The 
Office, a Community body with legal personality, would support BEREC and would 
have legal, administrative and financial autonomy. BEREC is more integrated to the 
EU legal framework than the ERG but it is also a less centralised governance tool 
than the initial Commission’s proposal on the establishment of a European agency in 
the telecom sector220.  
While the European agency in the energy sector emanated from proposals of the 
national regulatory authorities within the context of the ERG recognizing the value of 
voluntary cooperation between national regulatory authorities within a EU structure 
with clear competences and with the power to adopt individual regulatory decisions in 
a number of specific cases221, in the area of electronic communications, the BEREC 
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does not have any power to adopt individual regulatory decisions and is a much less 
integrated institution within the EU framework than ACER. Its aim is to contribute to a 
consistent regulatory practice by facilitating cooperation among NRAs, and between 
NRAs and the Commission. The BEREC does not duplicate the work of NRAs, but 
only aims to develop greater policy consistency among NRAs by helping them to 
exchange information and knowledge on their practical experiences and by 
intensifying cooperation and coordination. As it is clearly explained in Regulation 
1211/2009, “(t)he EU regulatory framework sets out objectives to be achieved and 
provides a framework for action by national regulatory authorities (NRAs), whilst 
granting them flexibility in certain areas to apply the rules in the light of national 
conditions”222.  
The different degree of integration to the Community structure of the European 
regulation of telecoms and energy may be explained by the varying levels of trust 
between national regulatory authorities in these two areas. The latter may be due to 
the variety of concerns addressed by energy regulation in comparison to the 
regulation of telecoms. Environmental concerns, security of supply and public service 
obligations are vague enough and provide more space for opportunistic behavior by 
NRAs in order to promote protectionist interests than the comparatively fewer public 
interest objectives and principles that are integrated in the Union’s legal framework 
for electronic communications. Because of the variety of objectives pursued and the 
possible occurrence of opportunistic behavior, one could reasonably assume that 
there was a lower level of trust between NRAs in the energy sector, in comparison to 
the telecom sector, which justifies the different patterns of evolution of institutional 
arrangements in these sectors, although, in both cases, the starting point was similar 
(loose networks of NRAs). It was felt that there need to limit the discretion of NRAs in 
the energy sector and that a regime more integrated to the EU institutional structure, 
could have led to fewer instances of opportunistic behavior. In the electronic 
communications sector, the regulatory framework did not promote pluralistic 
concerns but was mainly targeted to practices extending or reinforcing market power. 
This characteristic of the regulatory framework reduced the risk of opportunistic 
behavior by NRAs and enabled cooperation between them, without the need to have 
recourse to a more centralized institutional framework. In conclusion, the higher level 
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of institutional distrust between NRAs in the energy sector required the establishment 
of different institutions than in the telecommunications sector. 
 
4. The evolution of regulatory networks to more solidified and 
centralized regulatory authorities: the example of financial services 
 
In the financial services sector, the Lamfalussy process223, introduced in 2002 in 
securities regulation and in 2003 in banking and insurance, led to the development of 
a regulatory framework for the financial system in Europe, by integrating national 
regulatory authorities (NRAs) in the definition and operation of the newly adopted 
common standards. This approach based on the cooperation of NRAs followed the 
failure of the Single European Act to establish a European financial market, because 
of the difficulties faced in applying the principle of mutual recognition to banking, 
insurance and investment services224.  
In the 1960s and 1970s, the financial systems of EU Member States were largely 
incompatible to each other225, in view of the different monetary systems, their loose 
cooperation in the monetary policy area, as well as the failure of integrating the 
freedom of cross-frontier provision of financial services in the Community acquis, 
notwithstanding the significant steps taken with regard to the right of establishment of 
foreign banks with the adoption of the first banking directive in 1977226. These first 
attempts of Community harmonization contained a major innovation in so far as they 
institutionalized cooperation procedures through the creation of Committees 
composed of senior civil servants from the Member States as well as from the 
European Commission, thus associating both the Commission and the Member 
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States in the initiation of legislation in this area227. This cooperation expanded with 
the development of the European Monetary System in 1979. 
The principle of equivalence with its deregulatory potential formed the cornerstone 
of the development of the European framework in this area. The Single European 
Act’s strategy in the financial services sector was based on the belief that 
liberalization, in the sense of restricting regulatory barriers to trade, was a 
prerequisite to progress in the Internal Market228. This required a coordinated effort to 
achieve in view of the important proliferation of state and non-state like actors in the 
political game: umbrella organizations representing banks, insurance companies, 
consumer associations, at both EU and international levels, such as the International 
Federation of Stock Exchanges, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, the Basel Committee on banking Supervision, international 
organizations involved in this area, such as the OECD, UNCTAD, the GATT and 
major players in the global financial industry, such as the US and Japan. The aim of 
market integration had also to accommodate additional concerns than trade gains, 
such as financial stability, the need for prudential regulation, the preservation of the 
global competitiveness of the European financial industry sector, the linkage of the 
financial services sector with monetary and more broadly economic policy.  
As it is illustrated by the choice of the instrument of harmonization by community 
directives, the simple operation of the equivalence principle through a case by case 
enforcement of the negative integration rules would have been inadequate, precisely 
because of the plurality of public interests to take into account and actors to involve. 
However, as Jonathan Story and Ingo Walter noted in their seminal study of financial 
integration in Europe, 
“(f)inancial services proved the least amenable to legislative activism. Trust 
between Europe’s financial centres was a scarce commodity. Competition 
prevailed over cooperation. Tax regimes differed. Ideas diverged about the 
role of capital markets.229” 
 The result of the opposition between these divergent forces led to a stalemate 
for more than a decade, before the Council of the Union proposed the Financial 
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Services Action Plan (FSAP), which was finally adopted in March 2000. The FSAP 
included a number of legislative measures, defined across strategic objectives, with 
the objective to advance convergence between the different financial systems of the 
Member States, in view, in particular, of the monetary union and the constitution of a 
single currency230. The bulk of the work for the FSAP was done by a Financial 
Services Policy Group, composed by personal representatives of the ECOFIN 
ministers, the European Central Bank, and put under the chairmanship of the 
Commission. Establish linkages between national bureaucracies and the European 
Institutions active in the reform of the financial sector was an important part of this 
strategy. As it was acknowledged in the FSAP, 
“(a)t present, decisions on appropriate supervisory arrangements are 
determined at national level, and the supervision of the banking, insurance 
and securities sectors is predominantly conducted at that level. Member 
States have developed different models for performing these tasks. Mutual 
confidence in the effectiveness of partner country financial supervision and 
regulation – whether that be undertaken by a consolidated authority for the 
entire sector or by separate sectoral authorities that co-operate and co-
ordinate effectively – is the key ingredient for successful cross-border 
supervision”231. 
An important ingredient of this new governance structure was the involvement of 
key stakeholders in order to promote “a more inclusive and consensual approach in 
shaping policy from an early stage and in advance of drafting legislation”, including 
not only the EU institutions or representatives of national regulators, but also market 
practitioners and consumers232. This constituted a major evolution from the 
framework existing at the time for cross-border cooperation, which consisted of 
bilateral Memoranda of understanding between national supervisors. The 
collaboration with international private fora, such as the Basel Committee, or the 
constitution of new “high level” European fora representing stakeholders and 
integrating them in the process of forging consensus, “without prejudice to the 
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Commission’s legal right of initiative”233, formed part of this new strategy. The 
creation by the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers in July 2000 of a 
Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, under 
the chairmanship of Alexandre Lamfalussy, can also be explained by the need to 
combine expertise in a quickly evolving sector with the benefits of a “committee of 
independent persons234” that would include in the process national regulators and the 
various groups and interests affected by the emerging regulatory framework.  
Concretely, the Lamfalussy report initiated a new mechanism to promote 
convergence in the European financial supervisory practice, based on four levels235. 
At Level 1, the Commission can initiate a formal proposal setting broad framework 
principles which can be adopted by the Council and the Parliament by means of 
Directive/Regulation, after a full consultation process under the normal EU legislative 
procedure. At the second level, new committees have been established: a European 
Securities Committee (ESC) in the area of securities and the European Banking 
Committee in the banking sector, with the mission to assist the European 
Commission in determining how to implement the details of the Level 1 framework. 
These Committees composed of high level Member State representatives are 
chaired by the Commission. Their role in the process is central.  
The Lamfalussy process thus recognized two layers in the legislation related to 
financial markets: basic political choices translated into broad but sufficiently precise 
framework norms (Level 1) and more detailed technical measures, in full conformity 
with this framework, which implement the objectives pursued by the legislation (Level 
2). The ESC and other Level 2 committees have been vested with enough 
comitology powers to revise and update EU legislation, in addition to their advisory 
function. At Level 3, lay committees composed by national regulators: the Committee 
of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) or the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR), which work on joint interpretation, recommendations, consistent 
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guidelines and common standards (in areas not covered by EU legislation) through a 
peer review process, and a comparison of regulatory practices across the Union to 
ensure consistent implementation and application. These Level 3 committees ensure 
a more effective cooperation between national supervisors and a convergence of 
regulatory and supervisory practices. At Level 4, the Commission can monitor the 
process by checking compliance in Member States and eventually taking legal action 
against member States suspected of breach of the EU framework. 
 This process may be presented as a classic example of negotiation in the 
shadow of hierarchy236, where hierarchy is defined as any legislative and executive 
decisions “that steer democratic governmental action at the national and European 
level”237. The process involves the Member States as long as they cooperate in the 
design and implementation of the common standards. In the absence of a 
cooperation strategy from their part, the Commission may still intervene. A “double 
delegation of powers and functions” thus characterizes the governance 
arrangements in the financial services sector: this is exercised either “upwards” from 
the national independent regulators to the Commission or “downwards” from the 
European Commission to regulatory networks238. Coen and Thatcher conclude that 
European Regulatory networks, such as the CESR, lack powers and resources, and 
they exercise mainly an advisory (and secondary) role: for example, the CESR can 
shape policy “in so far as it can influence the Commission”239. 
Yet, other accounts of the operation of the Level 3 committees in the context of the 
Lamfalussy process report that the absence of a political consensus between the 
main principals (the European Parliament and the Council) in the creation of the 
Markets and Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID) at level 1 left important political 
decisions to be taken by the CESR (acting as an agent) at levels 2 and 3240. That led 
to an expansion of the CESR’s role and its transformation to a “central agenda setter” 
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in the process241. The conceptualization of the CESR as operating in the shadow of 
hierarchy does not also consider that the European Commission’s (the intermediary 
principal) initial proposals for introducing comitology in the financial sectors did not 
include the establishment of level 3 committees, such as CESR, but only a level 2 
committee, the ESC. According to Posner, the development of an “autonomous role” 
for the CESR, beyond its original mandate, was not expected by some of the 
principals in the process (the European Parliament and the Commission) and can be 
explained by a number of attributes: its members’ expertise in a highly technical 
sector, the open consultation processes that enhanced its reputation as an expert 
technical body in touch with the fast-changing market developments, the “internal 
capacity-building processes” that included coordination through peer review or 
transparent benchmarking, the ongoing deliberation process and the existence of 
conflict-resolution mechanisms242. The conceptualization of regulatory networks as 
operating under the shadow of hierarchy provides thus a partial explanation of their 
operation and objectives. It is submitted that, besides the technical expertise, which 
could have been acquired through different means than the constitution of networks 
of NRAs, the Lamfalussy approach is intrinsically participatory, consensus-driven and 
based on open consultation with the aim to promote convergence and build “mutual 
trust to ensure better implementation” of the EU framework243, through mediation, 
delegation of tasks, information sharing. One could also note their contribution to the 
development of a “common supervisory culture” through staff exchanges and training 
programmes244. 
 Furthermore, the theory of negotiation under the shadow of hierarchy does not 
provide the adequate theoretical framework to explain the replacement of the level 3 
committees with a more integrated and centralized institutional structure at the EU 
level, following the de Larosière report245. The theory fails to explain why the 
evolution towards a more centralized structure was required, in so far as the “shadow 
of hierarchy” could already constrain the freedom to act of national supervisors. It is 
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submitted that the high levels of distrust between national supervisors, because of a 
higher likelihood of opportunistic behavior in a period of economic and financial crisis 
and the consequent development of a more intensive competition between Member 
States increased the costs of cooperation between them under the current 
framework246.  
We provide some context on the reform before moving to implications for our 
discussion on governance mechanisms. The Commission has recently made 
proposals for a reform of the institutional structure of the EU supervisory architecture 
and the constitution of a European System of Financial Supervisors. The proposals 
establish a new body, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) with the aim to 
ensure macro-prudential and macro-economic risks regulation and three European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESA), the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which will replace the existing Lamfalussy 
level 3 committees.  
The ESAs are Community bodies with legal personality; they have increased 
responsibilities to adopt technical standards by qualified majority voting, as well as a 
general power to ensure the consistent application of EU law. A more formal dispute 
settlement mechanism enables the ESAs to settle disagreements between national 
supervisory authorities, by adopting a binding decision. The new institutional 
arrangement is also justified by the development of a single rule book in order to 
ensure a “uniform application of rules in the EU”, the main task of the ESAs being to 
monitor the implementation of the rules by the national supervisors247. In contrast to 
the Lamfalussy committees, the ESA may take decisions requiring a national 
supervisory authority to take a specific action or to refrain from an action. In the event 
the national supervisory authority does not comply, the ESA may act as a last resort 
and adopt a decision directly applicable to the specific financial institutions.  
These increased responsibilities for the ESAs, in comparison to level 3 Lamfalussy 
committees, the “comply or explain” approach followed with regard to national 
supervisors and better funding may lead inevitably to the emergence of a more 
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centralized system at the EU level. However, they still confer an important role to 
national supervisors, because of their local knowledge and their close relation to day-
to-day operation of companies. The Commission does not exclude a further 
centralization of the European system of financial supervision after the next review to 
be completed in three years, if this proves necessary248. 
The internal organization of the ESAs and the ESRC, illustrate also the evolution 
towards a more centralized model. The board of supervisors is certainly the main 
decision making body of the ESAs. It includes as its voting members the heads of the 
relevant national supervisory authorities in each Member State. At the same time, the 
management board that prepares the ESAs work program and adopts the rules of 
procedure includes a representative from the Commission and four elected members 
of the Board of supervisors who “shall act independently and objectively in the 
Community interest”249. A full-time independent chair of the ESA will be responsible 
for preparing the work and chairing the meetings of the Board of Supervisors and the 
Management Board, a noticeable change from the loose internal structure of the level 
3 Lamfalussy committees. The ESRB does not have a legal personality but is a new 
European body, whose strength lies in the composition of its General Board, 
comprising of governors of national central banks, the president and vice-president of 
the European Central Bank (ECB), a member of the European Commission and the 
chairpersons of the ESAs. The Chair of the General Board is elected for a period of 5 
years and its activity is supported by the secretariat of the ECB. Although the ESRB 
cannot adopt binding decisions, it is anticipated that it will have an important moral 
authority because of its high level composition250. It is apparent that these changes 
mark an evolution towards a more centralized governance mechanism. 
 
5. Open Method of Coordination 
 
 The open method of coordination constitutes an additional route for 
coordination and constitution of a common regulatory culture. The method was first 
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relied on for the coordination of employment policies at the Lisbon European socio-
economic summit in 2000 and later extended to a variety of policy areas, mainly in 
the areas of economic policy and employment strategy251, where it was conceived of 
as a tool for the progressive Europeanization of domestic social policy252. The OMC 
has also expanded to a number of areas beyond social and economic governance 
(including fiscal policy), such as immigration and asylum, occupational health and 
safety, innovation policy, environmental protection. The exact content of this method 
varies considerably, depending on the characteristics of the policy field or the cross-
sectoral, sectoral or sub-sectoral character of the reform but the main ingredients of 
the OMC have been defined by the Lisbon European Council’s conclusions in 2000, 
according to which the OMC is a: 
“[...] means of spreading best practice and achieving greater convergence 
towards the main EU goals. This method, which is designed to help Member 
States to progressively develop their own policies, involves: 
-  fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables 
for achieving the goals which they set in the short, medium and long 
terms;  
- establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative 
indicators and benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to 
the needs of different Member States and sectors as a means of 
comparing best practice; 
- translating these European guidelines into national and regional 
policies by setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into 
account national and regional differences; 
- periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as 
mutual learning processes. 
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[...] A fully decentralised approach will be applied in line with the principle of 
subsidiarity in which the Union, the Member States, the regional and local 
levels, as well as the social partners and civil society, will be actively involved, 
using variable forms of partnership. A method of benchmarking best practices 
on managing change will be devised by the European Commission networking 
with different providers and users, namely the social partners, companies and 
NGOs [...]”253. 
 There are considerable differences in OMC modalities and procedures: the 
well established and historic OMCs, such as the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
(BEPGs) and the European Employment Strategy (EES) involve EU institutions, the 
Parliament and the Council, which can issue joint recommendations to Member 
States for the implementation of the detailed BEPGs and EES. In other cases, 
common European benchmarks and statistical indicators have been devised in order 
to facilitate cooperation and coordination between the different Member States. In the 
social sphere, the Member States are also required to prepare National Action Plans, 
National Strategy Reports or National Progress Reports, which are subjected to the 
peer review and mutual surveillance of the representatives of other Member States in 
sectoral Committees, such as the Employment Committee, the Social Protection 
Committee or the Economic Policy Committee. A common characteristic of all OMC 
procedures is the non reliance on binding legislation, but instead to “voluntary” 
compliance and incentives, the co-ordination rather than harmonization of national 
policies, and the participation of a number of stakeholders and actors beyond 
Member States.  The OMC fulfills thus a different aim than the traditional 
harmonization or market liberalization approach. According to Sabel and Zeitlin, “the 
OMC was envisaged by its architects as a “third way” for EU governance between 
regulatory harmonization and fragmentation, capable of reconciling the pursuit of 
common European objectives with respect for national diversity while encouraging 
mutual emulation and experimental learning through comparison of different 
approaches to shared problems”254. 
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6. The “new approach” to harmonization: taming regulatory diversity 
 
 Managing, rather than suppressing diversity becomes an important concern in 
the regulation of intra-EU trade. Instead of adopting a detailed harmonization of 
national rules or excluding their application through the joint operation of the principle 
of equivalence and the market access rule, the European Commission has initiated 
since the late 1970s a “New approach” to harmonization, which proceeds in defining 
only the relevant essential requirements that goods have to meet when they are 
marketed, and delegates the task for the development of these standards to specific 
standard setting bodies255. This approach is referred to below as “managed 
harmonization” in order to illustrate its selective, partial and decentralized form in 
comparison with the classic exhaustive “old” harmonization tool. The “new approach” 
offers a considerably degree of flexibility to economic operators who are allowed to 
choose the way they conform to the requirements of the principle of mutual 
recognition. Member States are also more involved in the process as they can 
perform controls of the products for both the pre-market (conformity assessment 
modules) and post-market (market surveillance) stages. The new approach also 
establishes an early warning system requiring the notification of the adopted 
measures to the Commission and other Member States and the accreditation of the 
products by national conformity assessment bodies. 
Market surveillance entails an effective cross-border administrative co-operation 
between Member States. Yet, originally, there was no systematic exchange of 
information between Member States concerning the criteria and procedures applied 
at national level for the assessment and surveillance of the bodies put in place, which 
has encouraged suspicion about uneven levels of implementation.  The Commission 
has then quickly put in place mechanisms to increase the levels of confidence and 
trust between Member States, for the good operation of the system256. However, it 
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also noted that “Community harmonisation legislation shall restrict itself to setting out 
the essential requirements determining the level of such protection and shall express 
those requirements in terms of the results to be achieved257.  
 
7. Managed regulatory mutual recognition: the example of the Services 
Directive 
 
The principle of regulatory mutual recognition offers an alternative governance 
mechanism than harmonization and judicial mutual recognition. It provides more 
flexibility than the “new approach” as it “obviates the need to set EU norms for a 
particular area or sector altogether – leaving it to Member States to set standards to 
protect public interest concerns, whilst avoiding that differential standards amount to 
barriers to trade”258. It also appeals to a different institution than courts, for dispute 
resolution, by providing mediation between conflicting interests at the regulatory 
level. Judicial mutual recognition may, however, evolve to regulatory mutual 
recognition. The free movement of goods offers an illustration of this evolution: 
following the Cassis de Dijon judgment of the ECJ259, the principle of mutual 
recognition was reframed and codified in legislative texts260.  
The Services directive provides an interesting illustration of regulatory mutual 
recognition261. It is well known that the initial draft of the Services Directive attempted 
to bring a substantial change from the status quo262. The principle of the country of 
origin, included in the initial version of the proposal, subjected the provision of 
services (authorization, exercise, consumer protection) entirely to the rule and 
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controls of the home Member State, the host state not being able to impose 
additional requirements nor to monitor their enforcement. The country of origin would 
have thus led to a complete transfer of regulatory authority from the host state to the 
home State.  
If one adopts the assumption that regulatory systems represent domestic 
preferences and institutional conditions at the domestic level determining the balance 
between divergent domestic interests263, such transfer of authority involves the 
acceptance that only foreign interests will be represented in the decision-making 
process. There should be a considerable level of trust between the different systems. 
A simple similarity of values and regulatory culture would not be sufficient. Nicolaidis 
and Egan rightly remark that “even high regulatory compatibility does not in itself 
produce absolute trust, and thus is not matched by full delegation of authority”264. 
One could, indeed, distinguish between the principle of “pure” mutual recognition 
from that of “managed mutual recognition”, the latter enabling the host state to 
impose its own rules concerning the authorization, exercise and quality requirements 
on a cross-border service provider, of course as long as the principles of equivalence 
and proportionality are kept in sight. Kalypso Nicolaidis explains: 
“(a)s an outcome, managed mutual recognition can be contrasted with 
‘pure’ mutual recognition in the same sense as managed trade can be 
contrasted with absolute free trade. Pure mutual recognition implies the 
granting of fully unconditional and open-ended rights (of action, access) to 
private market agents as a product of a free trade contract between states. In 
contrast, managed mutual recognition introduces conditionality in the contract. 
The four main dimensions along which mutual recognition can be managed or 
fine-tuned are: (a) prior conditions for equivalence, from convergence to inter-
institutional agreements; (b) varying degrees of automaticity of access (for 
example, residual host country requirements; (c) scope of activities or features 
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covered by recognition; and (d) ex post guarantees or safeguards, including 
mutual monitoring and ultimately provisions for reversibility”265. 
It is well known that the final version of the Directive did not include the principle of 
the country of origin, and replaced it with a “freedom to provide services” clause. 
Article 16 of the Directive requires Member States to abstain from imposing their own 
requirements on cross-border service providers (but they can still impose them to 
their own national operators) except where justified by the four reasons enumerated 
in Article 16(1) and (3): public policy, public security, public health, protection of the 
environment. The latter offer only a limited, in comparison to the previous case law 
on imperative requirements of general interest, opportunity to Member State to follow 
diverse public interest objectives. Furthermore, any such requirements have to 
comply with the principles of non-discrimination, necessity and proportionality. Article 
16(2) lists a number of restrictions, for which there is a “strong presumption” that they 
cannot be justified by the four public interest objectives referred to previously, “since 
they will normally be disproportionate”266. However, this falls short of an obligation to 
refrain from all control.  
It is possible to conclude that the scope of managed regulatory mutual recognition, 
introduced by the Directive, offers less room to regulatory diversity than judicial 
mutual recognition, as it curtails the discretion of the Member States to justify 
restrictive measures. Contrary to the Directive, the case law has been always open-
ended on the list of reasons of public interest that can justify a restriction to the 
freedom to provide services. At the same time, the scope of application of the 
principle of managed regulatory mutual recognition is narrower than that of judicial 
mutual recognition.  
First, a long list of sectors is excluded from the application of the Directive’s 
principle of “freedom to provide services”267. The Treaty provisions on the freedom to 
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provide services (and the market access rule) may still apply for these sectors and 
some of these services are already subject to sectoral regulation at the EU level (e.g. 
financial services, electronic communications and networks).  
Secondly, article 1(6) of the Directive pronounces that it does not affect labour law 
or the social security legislation of the Member States, including all legal or 
contractual provisions concerning employment conditions, working conditions, health 
and safety at work and the relationship between employers and workers. The 
Directive has no impact on fundamental rights and proffers that there is no inherent 
conflict between the exercise of fundamental rights and the fundamental freedoms of 
the Treaty; “neither prevails over the other”268. 
Thirdly, article 17 of the Directive contains a number of derogations from the 
principle of “freedom to provide services”: services of general economic interest and 
intellectual property rights are among the activities covered by these derogations, as 
well as a number of activities which have already been subjected to EU 
harmonization measures. Finally, Article 18 allows for derogations from the principle 
of “freedom to provide services” on a case by case basis for safety reasons. This is 
done under strict conditions, in particular the requirement for the host Member State 
to assess whether the measures considered provide a “real added value” over 
measures adopted by the home State or to require the assistance of the home 
Member State prior to imposing unilaterally these measures. These numerous 
exceptions were placed in the Directive with the aim to attenuate the effect of the 
principle of the country of origin and in order to achieve consensus among Member 
States for its adoption269. The fact that they have been maintained, even after the 
abandonment of the country of origin principle, indicates that the Member States 
have gained some regulatory autonomy in these sectors, as it is improbable that the 
case law will take an opposite direction and apply the market access rule in an 
expansive way. 
It is significant that the Commission’s communication concerning the 
consequences of the Cassis judgment in the area of the free movement of goods270 
emphasized only the Commission’s role in implementing the principle of mutual 
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recognition. The Services directive goes much further and contains a number of 
provisions establishing an administrative cooperation between Member States. The 
objective is to create an institutional mechanism in order to manage “infrastructural 
heterogeneity” within Member States which can be a barrier to cross-border 
cooperation271. The Directive first proceeds to an administrative simplification of the 
procedures and formalities applicable to service providers272. In particular, it requires 
Member States to set up “points of single contact” as single interlocutors for service 
providers, thus enabling the collection and exchange of information between them. 
For example, Member States have to accept documents from other Member States 
which serve an equivalent purpose and which indicate that the requirement in 
question has been satisfied. Such measures of simplification as well as the 
provisions of the Directive on the quality of services increase the confidence of 
consumers to foreign providers of services. More importantly, the Directive promotes 
a deep level of administrative cooperation between the Member States, as a 
prerequisite for the operation of the principle of managed regulatory mutual 
recognition. The aim is “to enhance both mutual trust between Member States and 
the confidence of providers and consumers in the Internal market”273.  
 Concretely, chapter VI of the Directive sets a system of cooperation based on 
the obligation of mutual assistance between the competent authorities of Member 
States274. This obligation is comprehensive and encompasses also the possibility to 
find and exchange information between the different national authorities. The Internal 
Market Information (IMI) System, constituted at this respect, offers the technical 
means to promote communication between Member States275. This networked 
environment complements existing initiatives in other areas, such as the RAPEX 
(Rapid alert system for non-food dangerous products), the RASFF (Rapid alert 
system for food and feed) or the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network. Its aim 
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consists in “the building of mutual trust” and the establishment of a partnership where 
responsibility is “shared” between the Member States and the Commission276. 
Articles 30 and 31 of the Directive provide for a clear division of supervisory tasks 
between the different Member States in cross-border service provision, depending on 
the nature of the measures and rules envisioned: if these do not fall under the scope 
of the “freedom to provide services” it is the host Member state which is responsible 
to supervise the activity of the provider; if the measures fall within the scope of 
Articles 16 and 17 and are thus prohibited, it is the home Member State that ensures 
compliance with its own national requirements and guarantees that the service 
provider has the required authorizations, the host Member State being only able to 
carry factual checks on its own initiative under specific conditions277. Finally, if the 
host Member State benefits from a case by case derogation under Article 18, there is 
a specific procedure for managing these situations of breaking-trust278. 
 One of the most innovative aspects of the Services Directive is the mutual 
evaluation process that enables Member States to comment on the reports submitted 
by other Member States after reviewing their legislation for conformity to the 
Directive279. The Commission will provide annually analyses and orientations on the 
application of these provisions in the context of the Directive. The recent 
Commission’s Communication “Towards a Single Market Act” reiterates the 
importance of the mutual evaluation mechanism and suggests its extension beyond 
the Services directive280. This forms part of the broader strategy of the Commission 
to build a partnership with the Member States in the management of the Internal 
Market281. As it was acknowledged by the Commission in its Recommendation on 
measures to improve the functioning of the single market,  
“(t)he measures taken by the Member States and those taken by the 
Commission should complement each other. A coordinated and cooperative 
                                                 
276
 Commission Recommendation on measures to improve the functioning of the single market, [2009] 
OJ L 176/17. According to the most recent Communication from the Commission, Towards a Single 
Market Act, COM(2010) 608 final, at 31, the Commission will extend the application of the IMI to other 
legislative areas than the Services Directive. 
277
 These conditions are set by Art. 31(4) of Directive 2006/123/EC, above: the checks inspections or 
investigations should not be discriminatory, they should not be motivated by the fact that the provider 
is established in another Member State and they should be proportionate. 
278
 Art. 35 of Directive 2006/123/EC, above. 
279
 Art. 39 of Directive 2006/123/EC, above. 
280
 Communication from the Commission,Towards a Single Market Act, above, p. 31. 
281
 Ibid., p. 32. 
 80 
 
approach — in partnership between the Commission and Member States — 
with a common objective of improved transposition, application and 
enforcement of single market rules, is vital to ensure the proper functioning of 
the single market. The partnership approach […] goes beyond the already 
established cooperation in a number of single market policy areas. It requires 
establishing and maintaining closer cooperation within and between the 
Member States, and with the Commission, in all areas that are relevant for the 
single market. It also implies that Member States assume shared responsibility 
for and therefore a more proactive role in managing the single market282. 
 
* 
 
In conclusion, these different case studies illustrate the porosity of the tripartite 
distinction between the market access/national treatment rule, the principle of 
equivalence and that of harmonization as discrete governance mechanisms. The 
emergence of different forms of cooperation in various sectors of trade in services, 
based on the development of the overarching principle of mutual recognition, as well 
as the failure of adopting a more horizontal and uniform approach for the regulation 
of trade in services, following the retreat of the country of origin principle from the 
final version of the Services directive, illustrate the complex interaction between the 
centrifugal forces of pluralism and the centripetal tendencies of managing the risks of 
cooperation. These tensions eventually lead to the emergence of different 
cooperation equilibria in various sectors. 
 
C. Pluralism, trust and distrust 
 
The conclusion that one may draw from the survey of governance tools in the 
previous sections is that “ideal” governance categories, such as national treatment, 
market access and harmonization do not correspond to the much more complex 
reality of regulating inter-state trade in services. Managed market access, managed 
mutual recognition, managed harmonization, regulation through networks and 
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agencies, governance by delegation to private parties, open method of coordination 
and other soft coordination mechanisms compose a much more complex picture of 
the various governance arrangements in the area of services trade. They also 
challenge common assumptions on the location of these different governance 
mechanisms in the continuum between the poles of regulatory diversity/regulatory 
pluralism and centralism/uniformity, which can either refer to the adoption of common 
regulatory standards (harmonization) or the free interplay of demand and supply in a 
“Single” market for regulations (pure mutual recognition with race to the bottom) or 
services (pure market access). 
 
 
 
In this mapping exercise (see Table 1), managed harmonization does not lead 
automatically to centralism and rests between the two poles. The active involvement 
of national independent regulatory authorities in the negotiation and evolving 
constitution of harmonized standards, as it has been the case with the Lamfalussy 
process in the financial services sector or with the NRAs networks in the energy and 
telecom sectors, ensures that national diversities and regulatory cultures will be 
taken into account. The continuous involvement of these authorities in the process 
guarantees that this is not a one-off inclusion but a continuous interaction where 
experiences are shared and regulatory experimentation is valued. The Open Method 
of Coordination with its emphasis on dialogue, partnership, peer review and 
benchmarking seems also to influence the strategy followed by recent attempts of 
managed harmonization, such as the Services Directive, signaling the progressive 
abandonment of the strict format of detailed sectoral rules for more open-ended 
Centralism
y 
 Pluralism 
 
Managed 
market 
access 
Harmonization 
Pure market access 
Managed 
harmonization 
 
Managed 
mutual 
recognition/ 
principle of 
equivalence 
Open 
Method of 
coordination 
TABLE 1: THE POLES OF 
PLURALISM AND CENTRALISM 
No negative 
externality 
Pure mutual recognition 
with race to the bottom 
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standards and relying on the continuous cooperation and interaction between 
national authorities to manage conflicts. 
Yet it seems that the European Court of Justice has not taken stock of this 
evolution and is still treating the market access-national treatment rule/mutual 
recognition/harmonization trilogy as the holly triad of European Internal market law. 
For example, in the recent Ker-optica case on free movement of goods the Court 
held that “Article 34 TFEU [the equivalent article for the free movement of goods to 
Art. 56 TFEU] reflects the obligation to comply with the principles of non-
discrimination and of mutual recognition of products lawfully manufactured and 
marketed in other Member States, as well as the principle of ensuring free access of 
EU products to national markets”283. There might be a reason explaining the 
stickiness of the trilogy in the judicial imagery of the Internal Market project and the 
failure to capture the managed character of market access, recognition and 
harmonization. 
A possible explanation is that the trilogy may perfectly explain the process of 
economic integration if the latter’s aim is uni-dimensional: the erosion of barriers to 
trade with the removal of regulatory impediments and the convergence towards 
unified regulatory standards. However, in a legal order valuing regulatory pluralism, 
the outcomes of economic integration cannot be uniform. One should take into 
account the evolving objectives pursued by the different political and institutional 
entities that operate within the “directly-deliberative polyarchy” of the European 
regulatory area284. 
 In the polyarchic system of European governance, framework goals are jointly 
established by a multi-level institutional system comprising national ministries or 
national regulatory authorities, networks of national authorities, EU agencies and EU 
institutions, private entities (through codes of conduct): this constructs an Internal 
Market framework within which the lower-level units (national administrations) can 
protect public health, social solidarity, consumers, the environment in ways that grow 
out of their own traditions. As Mario Monti noted in his report on “A New Strategy for 
the Single Market”,  
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“(t)he single market itself is today part of a context, which has dramatically 
changed. In turn, the actors to be involved in the initiative – Europe's policy 
makers and stakeholders – are more diverse and present a wider range of 
preferences and interests” 285.. 
The plurality of objectives and interests, “economic” and “social”, embedded in the 
project of the Internal Market, cannot be brought to fruition within the simple 
framework of the market access/equivalence/harmonization trilogy that has long 
served as the mantra of the economic integration project. As we have previously 
shown these principles are not the only conceivable conceptual categories of 
governance in the Internal Market: there is a multitude of other tools and possible 
combinations that can achieve stochastic equilibrium in a pluralistic setting. Some 
institutional arrangements may therefore work in some areas but not in others. The 
regulation of trade in services constitutes a telling example of this plurality of 
objectives and consequently institutional arrangements that break with the traditional 
categories and highlight a different, theoretically richer, conception of economic 
integration than the joint aims of regulatory sameness and the erosion of barriers to 
trade. 
Nevertheless, this evolution contrasts with ambivalent rhetoric employed by the 
Commission. The completion of the Internal Market is seen as an economic 
modernization necessity and walks in pair with deregulation (towards a “single” 
market) or re-regulation at the EU level. Some have attempted to explain this 
apparent contradiction by the dis-embeddedness of the economic and the social 
dimensions in European integration, the economic being an EU competence while 
social policy being the exclusive choice of the Member States286. Others have more 
optimistically referred to the growing social regulation produced by the EU as an 
attempt to embed the Internal market to a new social framework that is independent 
from the nation-state287. Yet despite the experimentation of the EU in social 
regulation (to be distinguished from the concept of social policy288), this remains a 
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rather weak “countermovement” to the deregulatory paradigm shift brought by the 
Internal Market project289. The risk of a dis-embedded domineering market that will 
put an end to the “embedded liberalism290” post-war consensus and the subsequent 
national versions of it291, constitutes the main source of fears and reactions to the 
“completion” of the Internal Market project. 
 It is interesting to pause a little on the conceptualization by the European 
institutions of the problems to which is faced the project of economic integration and 
explain why it has not yet been “completed”. In his report on the New Strategy for the 
Single Market, Mario Monti noted the emergence of an “integration fatigue”, eroding 
the appetite for a single market, as well as a “market fatigue”, leading to a reduced 
confidence in the role of the market. Both undermine the acceptance of the Internal 
market project by the European citizens292. Monti clearly makes these comments in 
view of the dominant understanding of the aims of the single market as these were 
transcribed in the Commission’s White Paper on Completing the Internal Market in 
1985 where it was indicated that  
"the objective of completing the internal market has three aspects: […] the 
welding together of the […] markets of the Member States into one single 
market; […] ensuring that this single market is also an expanding market; […] 
ensuring that the market is flexible"293. 
The Internal market was thus conceived of as an exercise of unifying and 
expanding markets, where all sorts of barriers, physical, technical, fiscal, would 
shade away. This dominant rhetoric is still present in the way the European 
Commission envisions the project of the Internal market, and more generally, 
economic integration. The rhetoric of “barriers” and their ever expanding definition, 
hardly dissimulates that convergence of prices and costs of production across the 
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Union constitutes the aim to achieve294. The Commission’s report on the State of the 
Internal Market for Services, which served as the blueprint for the reforms introduced 
by the Services Directive is explicit on the identification of not only existing legal 
barriers to the development of services activities between Member States, but also of 
“non-legal barriers” which create “disincentives” for services trade, going from lack of 
information about the regulatory framework in other Member States to 
cultural/language differences and various consumer habits across the Union295. 
Barriers are ubiquitous and changing: they are no longer to be found in the body of 
legal texts but rather in administrative practices, in particular the discretionary power 
of appreciation left to national administrative authorities, they are the fact of regional 
or collective non-government rules and practices (in particular in the regulated 
professions) or of the conduct of individual operators that are still organizing their 
economic activities according to national boundaries296. One could imagine the 
extent of the Internal market project, should the need to “suppress” these “barriers” 
be followed literally. 
This approach is certainly negating any space to pluralism and regulatory diversity. 
If the objective is to become one, the different governance arrangements are 
provisional steps towards the ineluctable end-game of the emergence of the 
integrated market.  Harmonization versus pure market access principle becomes the 
only game in town. However, one could also find in the Commission’s rhetoric, germs 
of a different perspective on the aims of the project of the Internal market.  
Of particular interest is the analysis by the Commission in the State of the Internal 
Market for Services report of the “common origins of barriers”. These are essentially 
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explained by three factors. The first one is the lack of mutual trust between the 
authorities of the different member states which leads to the “simple evocation of 
general good objectives to justify obstacles, without verifying the equivalence of the 
protection offered in the country of origin or the proportionality of the restriction” and 
the “automatic suspicion of services from other Member States”297. The main reason 
for this distrust is allegedly the “ignorance” of the implications of the principles of 
establishment and free provision of services, the lack of transparency and 
administrative cooperation between member states and the “lack of harmonisation of 
the national rules, reflected in an excessive (sic) disparity between the levels of 
protection of the general good guaranteed by the national systems”298. Secondly, the 
Commission advances as an additional reason for the persistence of barriers the 
resistance to modernisation of the national legal frameworks originating from the 
“slightly outdated” regulation in some Member States, the weak monitoring of the 
judgments of the Court and the absence of a systematic approach against barriers to 
trade. Finally, the defence of purely national interests, which is “firmly anchored in 
certain Member States” is advanced as a third explanatory factor for the 
pervasiveness of barriers to trade299.  
Let’s take stock of these reasons for the “malaise” of the Internal market project. It 
is noteworthy that economic protectionism does not constitute the principal worry, as 
one would have expected. On the contrary, economic “modernisation” in the sense of 
liberalisation of trade and trust in the regulatory regime of other Member States are 
the focus of the Commission’s attention. One could venture that the goal of economic 
modernisation illustrates the mutation of the theoretical underpinnings of the Internal 
market project from a legal-rule based framework to a purely economic programme. 
But, at the same time, the reference to the necessary trust between national 
regulatory authorities offers a different conceptual background, where the problem is 
not so much the existence of domestic regulations, but rather the absence of 
interoperability between the different national regulatory systems. Regulatory 
compatibility and pluralism can thus be combined, under this view. What should be 
avoided is the absence of interconnection between the different national regulatory 
networks for reasons of distrust. The aim of the Internal market project becomes thus 
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transformed from an operation of forced regulatory convergence through 
harmonization or Single market creation to an operation of establishing relations of 
trust between the different regulatory systems across the Union. Let the era of 
“regulatory peace” begin! 300 
This shift has profound consequences on the interaction between the concept of 
economic integration and pluralism. If the main problem faced by economic 
integration regimes is the distrust between national regulators, because of the risk of 
opportunistic behavior (cheating, breaking of trust), the different governance 
mechanisms cannot be thought of as constituting the different stages of a process of 
integration that leads ultimately to “convergence” of regulatory systems, or any form 
of centralized control (EU regulation or the “single” market’s forces of supply and 
demand). Regulatory sameness is not the only desirable outcome but a possible 
outcome among others. What counts is the potential of these governance 
arrangements in generating inter-organizational trust301. Regulatory sameness and 
centralism constitute thus irrelevant variables to evaluate the progress of the project 
of economic integration. Less regulatory pluralism or less diversity do not necessarily 
qualify as progress in economic integration.  
One could thus envision an opposition between two poles, trust and 
power/control/authority, where it would be possible to map the different governance 
mechanisms as leaning towards one pole or the other, under the assumption that 
they constitute different organizing principles in managing risk. Authority or power will 
be an organizing principle of interdependence and uncertainty by reallocating 
decision-making rights302. Trust can be calculative and revolve around the idea of an 
advantageous cooperation where incentives for profit outweigh risk303.  
Nevertheless, such a conceptualization overlooks that trust and power constitute 
functionally equivalent and not necessarily mutually exclusive means to reduce risk. 
Lane and Bachmann distinguish between “interaction-based power”, which derives 
from individually accumulated resources (size, economic power, political influence) 
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and “system power”, which occurs in institutionalized form and “rests in collectively 
binding arrangements” that constraint “the options of opportunistic behaviour social 
actors might feel tempted to explore”304. The aim of “system power” is to generate 
“system trust”, that is “to encourage social actors to trust each other on the grounds 
of collectively binding rules which reduce the risk of trust”305. These can be enforced 
through an “institutionalized threat of collective sanctions” or a more informal 
mechanism, such as the use of hostages, a balance of mutual dependence, 
reputation costs. If the actors have a relationship of repeated interaction with a 
significant degree of interdependence the latter can be equally effective in reducing 
the risks of cooperation. For example, as EU Member States have a relation of 
repeated interaction and a significant degree of interdependence, reputation costs in 
case of non-performance are extremely high. This may progressively lead to weaken 
the case for establishing formal institutions with a power to impose sanctions, 
through the means of hard law, and may favour the reliance on cooperation 
mechanisms, based on trust, such as networks or soft law, in sectors where the 
establishment of formal institutions, monitoring, safeguarding and formal controls 
may be costly (because of negotiation costs, monitoring and compliance costs).  
It follows that trust and power/control cannot only be treated as substitutes but 
may also operate as complements in the context of the specific relationship of 
interdependence between organizations306. Yet this picture would be incomplete if 
one takes exclusively into account inter-organizational trust between Member States 
and does not include the other facets of “total trust”307: the trust between Member 
States as principals of the integrated EU institutions they put in place or trust in 
government, that is the confidence of citizens/economic operators to their 
government and EU institutions. The trust game is thus more complex as each actor 
aims to increase its trustworthiness at different levels. For example, even if we 
conceive that the EU institutions, such as the European Commission and the 
European Court of Justice, are acting as agents of Member States, we are not in a 
system with one or few principals but they face 27 diverse principals with different 
regulatory settings. In the absence of hegemonic control or veto power, each of the 
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principal thus retains only a small fraction of control of the agent and consequently it 
is more difficult and costly to hold agents to account308. In any case each governance 
mechanism will dither between the following four poles: system power, system trust, 
personalized trust and “interaction-based” power. 
 
 
 
The focus on trust preserves the integrity of the governance system in as much as 
personalized trust facilitates system trust. It is easier to cooperate and move to a 
system of mutual recognition if there is some degree of familiarity or similarity with 
the partner’s regulatory system. System trust also contributes to the emergence of 
system power when the risks of cooperation are substantial and justify the costs of 
establishing an heterarchical or hierarchical structure of monitoring and control, as is 
the case for regulatory harmonization (regulatory networks) or harmonization 
respectively. 
This approach is not the right one because it dissociates integration from 
centralism and thus preserves pluralism. It is also compatible with the evolution of EU 
integration and the emergence of hybrid governance mechanisms that challenge the 
existing conceptual categories of negative and positive integration or the market 
access/mutual recognition and harmonization triad. The centrality of the mutual 
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recognition principle in the process of governance of the European internal market 
illustrates also a shift from the focus on centralism and uniformity towards managing 
diversity through regulatory interoperability, or as Kalypso Nicolaidis puts it in this 
volume, an era of “regulatory peace”309 that accommodates regulatory pluralism.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 The opposition of constitutionalists and pluralists accounts of post-national law 
has been an important trend of recent EU law and integration scholarship310. 
Transposing this debate to the economic integration realm one could establish an 
analogy with the tensions between the integrationist tendency of the proponents of 
an “economic constitution” and the poly-archical conception of regulatory pluralism. 
These were initially accommodated by the decoupling of the economic and the social 
dimensions of integration and the institution of a functional pluralism where the 
decision-maker power for social policy was allocated at the national level and that of 
economic and trade liberalization at the European level. Such dichotomy was of 
course transitive and operated as long as the economic effects of trade liberalization 
did not affect negatively the interests of powerful domestic groups. The assumption 
was that a “countermovement” will take place at the national level in order to 
compensate the affected domestic groups for the distributive consequences 
engendered by the process of trade liberalization. 
However, the hierarchical structure of the EU legal order and its underlying monist 
constitutional dimension led to the emergence of intense normative conflicts between 
the logic of economic integration, perceived as trade liberalization, and that of 
national conceptions of social or distributive justice. Responding to this pressure, the 
realm of EU action was progressively extended to cover the field of social 
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regulation311, thus slowly overthrowing the dichotomy between the economic and the 
social dimension of European integration. As the social dimension was becoming 
part of the EU realm, the functional pluralism was replaced by a horizontal regulatory 
pluralism operating across different national regulatory systems, each of them 
attempting to influence the emerging social regulation system at the EU level, as a 
way to preserve the national arrangements and eventually to expand them in other 
jurisdictions.  
Yet the hard and fundamental character of legal norms protecting the principle of 
free movement in the EU legal framework, as well as the transformation of the 
political project of Internal market to a broader economic modernization venture, with 
the initiation of far reaching reforms of national welfare systems, following the Lisbon 
agenda, signalled that the balance between trade and social protection to be 
achieved at the EU level would be politically unacceptable to a number of Member 
States and interest groups. The demands for social Europe that culminated with the 
reactions to the proposals for the Services Directive and the fear that eastward 
enlargement will spur a race to the bottom for social welfare systems led to a more 
vocal affirmation of the principle of regulatory pluralism. 312 As was examined in Part 
I, regulatory diversity and “policy space” accommodating the Member States’ various 
social and regulatory traditions made its entrance to the monolithic and market 
integration focused jurisprudence of the ECJ as well as to EU harmonization efforts.  
 The turn from market access and harmonization to the principle of mutual 
recognition encapsulates this recognition of regulatory pluralism as, at least a 
descriptive claim, for EU integration. Taking stock of regulatory pluralism thus carries 
an acceptance of the various structures of policy institutions and accordingly the 
diverse substantive regulatory outcomes across Member States in terms of policy 
production. Yet, the existence of cross-border negative domestic policy externalities 
requires some form of coordination among the plurality of regulatory systems that 
compose the EU. Here the analogy between regulatory pluralism and constitutional 
pluralism loses its appeal. Accounts of pluralism by constitutional/institutional law 
theorists emphasize the conflict of values between the whole and the parts as the 
main problem faced by a pluralistic legal order or the interaction between various 
                                                 
311
  We use “social regulation” in the broad sense, thus also including environmental regulation. 
312
 N. Lindstrom, ‘Service Liberalization in the Enlarged EU: A Race to the Bottom or the Emergence 
of Transnational Political Conflict?’, JCMS , 48(5) (2010), 1307-1327. 
 92 
 
heterarchical legal orders. Some offer overarching substantive principle or norms in 
order to resolve conflicts, such as subsidiarity, due process and democracy313. 
Others prefer a jurisdictional framework and the application of conflict of law rules314 
or some form of subject matter dualism and mutual respect between legal orders315. 
Others suggest a procedural framework, that of “contrapunctual law” requesting from 
each system to integrate each other’s concerns by communicating them and, more 
importantly, by integrating their different claims of validity within the context of a 
coherent and integrated European legal order316.  
 This study has defended a different perspective than that of managing values 
or regulatory conflicts. The emphasis has been on the establishment of institutions, 
formal and informal, with the aim to manage the risks of cooperation between diverse 
regulatory systems. Likewise, the hypothesis was that the emergence of different 
governance mechanisms in the regulation of trade in services entails that the risks of 
cooperation are variable. The latter depend on the degree of interaction between the 
Member States and the existence of regulatory pluralism. By disentangling the focus 
of integration from managing or suppressing conflicts and thus regulatory diversity to 
establishing system trust between the different components, Member States, 
European institutions, economic operators and citizens, the trust theory of 
integration, defended in this study, offers real chances to regulatory pluralism in the 
EU.  
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